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INTRODUCTION
Terms most commonly used in description often lose their precision
and eventually their meaning. This is particularly true with politics
wherein hallowed norms and values are invoked so often and by such
divergent factions that their conceptual clarity is jeopardized. The
purpose of this essay is to explore some of the more basic of American
political terms and their attendant manifestations in the contemporary
context. Of primary interest will be the distinction between "public"
and "private," the character of the relationships which obtain between
elements of those supposedly discreet sectors, the notion of "public
interest" in whose name public authority is alleged to function, and the
public policy by which the public interest is enacted.
The essay will first attempt to generalize about these terms with
an historical sketch, then focus on a concrete instance of public-private
interaction followed by a broad look at another example of public-private
relationships
.
Some concluding remarks will summarize any "findings" and address
significant observations emerging from the study.
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CHAPTER I
A BACKGROUND SKETCH
Interpretation of the public interest has long been a major theme in
American politics. Despite its universal acclaim, however, it has not
always been achieved or even perhaps diligently sought after. Even before
the Constitution was adopted, there were evidently those who placed other
values ahead of it. In Federalist #45, Madison reminds his soon-to-be
countrymen of the meaning and importance of the public interest.
It is too early for politicians to presume on our
forgetting that the public good, the real welfare
of the great body of people, is the supreme object
to be pursued. . . . ^
Not the good of one or a few or even a large number, but the "welfare of
the great body of people" was proclaimed to be the guiding principle of
public authority. Since then claims made on behalf of the public interest
have been many and varied. As a result its definition has been continually
in question while its integrity as a concept has remained untarnished.
Durkheim has written that every society is a moral society; that is
"it entails a set of norms and values which live both in the minds of its
2
citizens and in the patterns of their social relations." Madison has
shown that the concept of the public interest was held in some esteem by
early American citizens. What remained was to determine its expression in
the "patterns of their social relations."
The Constitution of the United States provided the initial framework
for that expression. The three branches of government were to be balanced
so that one would not tyrannize over the others; officials were to be
2elected regularly in a representative way; and other measures were to be
taken by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches to promote the
general welfare. Among the expressed powers of the Congress was that
which allowed the peoples' representatives "to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 3
Madison said of this power that while it was admittedly novel, no one seemed
to oppose it and it had aroused no apprehensions.^
The power was new because it was claiming for the fledgling central
Government a prerogative previously held by the several individual States.
It was unopposed in principle because it was designed to correct problems
of trade experienced by the States under the Articles of Confederation.
Madison explained the idea behind the clause in a letter to J. C. Cabell
in 1829
,
long enough after the Constitution had been activated for the new
Nation to begin feeling the effects of its various privisons.
It is very certain that it [the commerce clause] grew
out of the abuse of the power of the importing state
in taxing the nonimporting and was intended as a negative
and preventive provision against injustice among the
States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for
the positive purposes of the General Government, in which
alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged.
In Madison's perspective, then, the Government was to stay out of the
commercial sector except to protect the States from each other.
Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution provides that "no State
6
shall . .
.
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.
This supports Madison's contention that public authority is not to
meddle in the affairs of private individuals or groups who do not abuse
the tax laws and whose commercial dealings are governed by legal contracts.
Madison and his colleagues could not have known how important these
3two clauses came to be. In them rests the germ of distinction between
public and private; between what the government can do in the name of the
public interest, and what it cannot do; between that with which it is
appropriate for public policy to deal, and that which is to be left to the
private sector. The commerce and contracts clauses have been used to forge
social policy
,
such as in those cases which brought about and later tested
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Their most obvious and long-standing appli-
cation, however, has been in commercial matters where public and private
interests are construed in economic terms. There may be several ways to
trace the development of the distinction between public and private and its
implications for public policy, but none more graphic than the legal evolu-
tion of the concept as expressed by the courts. To the extent that the
norms and values held by a nation are implied at all in patterns of social
relations, it is the laws and political institutions people devise and
accept which are most revealing about their basic beliefs and perceptions
of what is in the public interest. A brief and highlighted review of some
of the most significant legal and political developments in defining the
public and private sectors in the economic context will therefore provide
a necessary, but unfortunately abbreviated, introduction to a consideration
of the contemporary condition of this distinction, some of its implications
for public policy, and perhaps yet another interpretation of the public
interest.
The Corporation as a Private Legal Entity
In 1816 the New Hampshire legislature passed three acts designed to
wrest control of a college from its original group of trustees. Through a
confusing set of circumstances clouded by local politics and personalities.
4the case eventually reached the Supreme Court and established the key legal
precedent for the protection of private property against public control.
The majority opinion in Dartmouth College vs . Woodward (1819) was written
by Chief Justice Marshall and featured this now classical declarations
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. . . . It is no more a state instrument than a
natural person exercising the same powers would be. 7
The most obvious intent of this language is to accord to a corporation, an
association of individuals granted permission by the State, the Crown, or
whomever, to operate as a group for some legal purpose, the same status as
a legal citizen; i.e., a corporation is a private person with the same
rights and privileges granted to individuals by the Constitution. This
intent may be based on two explicit Constitutional privisions. First, in
terms of a Madisonian interpretation of the commerce clause, it is a denial
to the Federal Government of the right to regulate commerce, in the broadest
sense, within State boundaries. Second, and more precisely, Marshall invokes
the power of the contract clause to prohibit the State legislature from
interferring with a "private" contract; in this case, one allegedly agreed
upon by George III and the original trustees of the College. In a fascina-
ting article first printed in the Independent of August 19, 1909, Mr. Jesse
F. Orton of the New York Bar made a compelling case for the absurdity of
the Dartmouth College case as reliable precedent because of its erroneous
factual bases and assumptions. Nevertheless, Mr. Orton admitted that the
case "made law in regard to the most solemn and vital interests of a great
nation and is still, in spite of strong efforts to evade its consequences,
, t
8
a mighty force in the economic and social institutions of the country."
5Sixty-four years have mellowed its impact, but not erased it. The case is
so important in fact, that it is worthwhile to quote at length Orton's
succinct summary of Marshall's decision.
The chief question in the case was thought to be,
whether this institution was public or private.
. . .
Chief Justice Marshall admitted that the purpose of
the institution was public, that "education is an object
of national concern" and that "there may be an institution
founded by government and placed entirely under its im-
mediate control, the officers of which would be public
officers, amenable exclusively to government." His
decision was based on the conclusion that this institu-
tion was founded by private parties with private funds and
that the incorporation [by the State legislature] did
not change its character except to make it "immortal"
and its management more convenient.
9
Regardless of the merits of the case, the major implications were two.
First, that which may be defined as private is that which is initiated by
private money under private contract and, despite its effect upon the public,
is managed privately. Second, it is in the public interest to preserve such
entities from governmental regulation. The consequences of these implica-
tions may be viewed from two perspectives. The President of Yale University
wrote in 1908 that as a result of the Dartmouth College case, "the power
of control by the government was weakened and the rights and immunities of
10
the property holders correspondingly strengthened." In 1874, Justice
Cole of the Iowa Supreme Court had written that "the practical effect of
the Dartmouth College decision is to exalt the rights of the few above
those of the many . . . under the authority of that decision more monopolies
have been created and perpetuated, and more wrongs and outrages upon the
people effected, than by any other single instrumentality in the government."
In any case, Dartmouth College was clear in articulating the public's
interest in an unregulated private sector.
6Public Regulation of Private Interests
A second major but often ignored challenge to comprehensive public
authority came from John C. Calhoun in A Disquisition on Government
,
pub-
lished m 1853. The strains that tore the nation apart in civil war were
many, but one of the more crucial ones was the economic control of the
wealthier, industrial northern states over the agricultural South. Calhoun's
argument was simply that public policy should be generated on a more locali-
zed economic basis, not by a central government dominated by a consistent
majority to the exclusion of the interests of the equally consistent minority.
This was, in effect, a rather radical version of the Dartmouth College logic,
extending it to prohibit a central government from interfering with local
government representing discreet, private, economic interests.
[a just governmental system] can be accomplished only in
one way, and that is by such an organism of the govern-
ment.
. . as well by dividing and distributing the
power of government, give to each division or interest,
through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent
voice in making and executing the laws or a veto on
their execution.^
Calhoun perceived the public interest to be in the harmony of various smaller
interest units, each pursuing its own economic well-being without encroach-
ing upon the others, and each with a decisive voice in matters of common
concern. In other words, the public interest was in preserving separate
units of private interest. The Civil War made it clear that a unity of
national purpose, not the preservation of decentralized economic interests,
was the order of the day.
The Dartmouth logic suffered a frontal assault in Munn vs. Illinois
(1877)
,
in which the owner of a series of grain elevators attempted to
resist regulation by the State of Illinois. Chief Justice Waite wrote the
7words which have come to be a significant qualifier of the notion of a
corporation enjoying the same legal status as a person. Quoting Lord Chief
Justice Hale of more than two hundred years prior, Waite wrote:
Looking, then, to the common law, we find that when
private property is "affected with a public interest"
it ceases to be "juris privati" only
. . . Enough
has already been said to show that, when private
property is devoted to public use, it is subject to
public regulation.
The majority opinion emphasized the right of public authority to interfere
with private property in the public interest. Because the grain elevators
were used by farmers on the one hand and buyers on the other, the Court
viewed them as functionally within the public domain and thereby approp-
riate objects for public regulation. In the same case, however, was the
seed of destruction for this modification of Dartmouth in Justice Field's
dissent.
There is no magic in the language which can change a
private business into a public one. ... If this
[majority opinion in Munn ] be sound law, if there
be no protection
. . . against such invasion of private
rights, all property and all business in the States
are held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature.
The impact of Munn vs. Illinois was significantly reduced by Justice
Harlan in Mugler vs. Kansas (1887) in which he affirmed Field's dissent
of the earlier case.
It does not follow that every statute enacted ostensibly
for the promotion of these ends (protection of public
morals, helath, and safety) is to be accepted as a
legitimate exertion of the police powers of the State.
There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation
cannot rightfully go.^*5
In the guise of new language such as "police power" and protection of
public health and safety, a trend toward public regulation was blunted
8by busier, but not obliterated. Even in Harlan's basic reaffirmation
of the principles of Dartmouth College
,
there is room for "a legitimate
exertion of the police powers of the State." The absolute sanctity of
contract and its implication for the private sector as expressed in
Dartmouth
,
then, had been significantly abridged, first boldly by Munn
and then more circumspectly by Mugler.
The pattern to this point seems to be a recurrent support of private
property by the courts in the face of increasing regulatory attempts by
state governments. In 1868 with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
a dramatic reversal took place. Private interests began appealing for
Congressional and administrative protection against invidious and dis-
criminating state and local taxes and regulations. One of the first of
these cases was San Mateo County vs. Southern Pacific Railroad (1883) in
which Roscoe Conkling pled on behalf of the railroad that the county had
directed discriminatory taxes against the private company, and was
therefore in violation of the Constitution under the "due process" clause.
^
Excessive numbers of such cases, as well as the vast variety of regula-
tory laws which existed from State to State, led in 1887 to the estab-
lishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
It [the Commission ] was designed to bring monopoly
power under popular control; it was intended to be
expert; and it was built to be free of "politics". . .
For the most part, popular desire for regulation in
the public interest (as seen in Progressive terms)
was the more important and the more consistent
motivation.
Grant McConnell's parenthesis above is a subtle indication of an increas-
ingly obvious tension infusing the late 1800's. Private property in the
9form of railroads and industrial plants was expanding virtually unhamp-
ered by public authority, except for a few sniping attempts by parti-
cularly bold state governments. At the same time, the Progressives
were becoming a serious force in America. While they believed in the
ideal of free enterprise, they also were committed to the concept of
an active public interest as expressed through responsible public policy.
They recognized the evils of monopoly, while eschewing public control
as the alternative. Referring to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
Herbert Croly indicated that while it was "the first emphatic recogni-
tion in American political and economic organization of a manifest public
responsibility," it should be watched closely lest it "work more harm
than good." 18
It would be fair to state that prior to 1890, America was groping
for a way to manage her growing prosperity. While the commercial sector
was clearly the heart and soul of the country, there was some fear that
its unchecked progress might impair other parts of the body politic.
Then Congress took a firm stand against the courts and their support
of the fiercely independent business community by passing the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. The battle line was drawn; Congress on one side asserting
its power to accomplish purposes far beyond anything hitherto attempted
under the commerce clause, and the courts and "business" on the other
marshalling the due process clause and their own reading of the commerce
clause as their Constitutional weapons.
The Supreme Court struck hard at the Sherman Act in the 1896 E. C.
Knight decision which validated a virtual monopoly in sugar and shook
the hope that public policy could have a significant effect upon
10
private, i.e.
,
commercial affairs. Congress was swimming against the
tide. Although the disadvantages of monopoly and economic control by
small centers of private power were becoming more evident, Americans were
still convinced of the inviability of the "free enterprise" ethic. Those
who linked invigorated competition with an equality of economic advantage
as enforced by the Sherman Act were suspected of socialism. The bywords
of the Republic, "freedom" and "liberty," as Grant McConnell suggests, "in
that hour often meant nothing more complex than an absence of restraint by
20
government." Perhaps the temper of those times is caught most aptly by
Croly whose contention was that the public interest lay not in equality,
but in progress; and that the primary task of public policy should be to
avoid disturbing the momentum of private development
.
The huge corporations have contributed to American economic
efficiency. They constitute an important step in the
direction of better organization of industry and commerce.
They have not, except in certain exceptional cases, sup-
pressed competition; but they have regulated it. Deli-
berately to undo this work of industrial and commercial
organization would constitute a step backward in the
process of economic and social advance. 2 ^
It would not be an exaggeration to surmise that, for most people at the
turn of the century, what was good for commerce was good for the Nation.
Free Enterprise Revised
Champion vs. Ames (1903) was the first of a series of cases before
World War I that clearly established the principle that the commerce
_
22
power could be used as a device for accomplishing purely social goals.
Champion dealt with the sale of lottery tickets, and while Justice Harlan
was careful to declare that the case in question concerned only their
11
status as objects of interstate commerce, 23 the implications for a more
active public policy were not lost on the judiciary or the public.
Defenders of the independence of the commercial sector were quick to
point out that "however much public feeling may at times move in the
direction of socialistic measures , " this Nation would remain far from
socialism, for the integrity, of "property in the modern [ 1908 ] sense re-
presents the basis on which the whole social order was established and
24built up."
Nevertheless
,
modernity had brought a new set of situations with which
the more traditional free enterprise framework was having some difficulty
coping. Even such a staunch proponent of commercial independence as
Herbert Croly had to admit in 1914 that "private business of all kinds is
becoming affected with a public function," and that the "successful conduct
of both public and private business" depended upon the same kinds of admini-
25
strative and technological expertise. There was a sense that while the
commercial freedom that had built the country was surely a grand thing,
*
Congress had not been altogether wrong in trying to channel private enter-
prise in certain ways.
The Sherman Act had issued a challenge to the commercial sector, and
there had been considerable backing and filling in attempts to adjust,
philosophically as well as practically. One of the first scholarly works
which tried to come to terms with this transition was Arthur Bentley's
The Process of Government, first published in 1908 and in which was
announced
:
12
All phenomena of government are phenomena of croupspressing one another, forming one another, and pushing
out new groups and group representatives [the organs
or agencies of government] to mediate the adjustments. 26
Bentley depicted the American system as a dynamic, self-renewing polity
with government occupying a high profile as a referee for the commercial
contestants scrambling for prizes the growing nation had to offer. This
was a major departure from the vision of government as a guardian against
foreign invasion and trespasses of one state against another. The most
important part of Bentley's exposition was to elevate government to full
partnership in the American system—a partner whose task it was to broker
the interests of its private colleagues.
The nation was growing quickly and the demands upon public authority
were pressing resources to the limit. The country now spread from coast
to coast and war in Europe was imminent. America needed money. In 1913,
the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, giving the national treasury a needed
of dollars, and the traditional public—private distinction a severe
jolt. Some claimed to have recognized this trend all along.
For some twenty-five years there has been a marked recession
among English-speaking peoples from the strong individual-
ism of the early 19th century towards a gradual extension
of government authority in economic matters. 27
Whatever the percipience of some
,
the American ideal of unfettered free
enterprise was in need of revision.
There was a last-ditch holding effort by the Supreme Court to restore
the Dartmouth doctrine, despite Munn
,
the Sherman Act, Champion vs. Ames,
and the Sixteenth Amendment. While there was no going all the way back.
Justice Taft in the Wolff Packing Company case (1923)
,
did consider it
worthwhile to take issue with the "affected-with-public-interest ,
"
13
principle set forth in 1877 by the Munn case.
It is manifest.
. . . that the mere declaration bv
a legislature that a business is affected with a
public interest is not conclusive of the question
whether its attempted regulation on that ground is
justified. 28
This was, in fact, a paraphrase of Field's dissent in Munn, and while it
perhaps carried the moment, it did not carry the day. The courts and the
commercial sector had put Congress on the defensive with the Knight case
in 189G, but it was now the legislative branch pressing the advantage.
Still, there was considerable confusion about the relationship of
government to the private sector and to what extent governmental control
was in the public interest. In Profit and Social Security published in
1935, Nelson B. Gaskill emphasized the uncertainties by citing first Munn
vs- Illinois and its successors wherein the public interest was seen to be
in government regulation of private enterprise in a few conspicuously
"public-private" concerns, the anti-trust cases in which the public interest
seemed to be related to all instances of commerce, and finally such cases
as Wolff in which the public interest was seen to obtain only under special
29
circumstances and conditions. The Great Depression was, if a cruel
catalyst, an event which forced the nation to some kind of consensus on this
issue. Private power had failed to supervise itself properly. When it
collapsed, it brought ruin not only to the corps of managers who could be
held responsible for it, but to thousands of Americans whose lives were
permanently blighted. If it did nothing else, the Depression confirmed
the foresight of those who had earlier argued for a firmer government hand on
the private sector. Even the courts were beginning to realize this. Two
key cases set the legal tone for the Nation until after the second world
14
wax. In Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell (1934) Chief
Justice Holmes began with Justice Taft's words to completely reverse Wolff:
It is manifest ... that there has been a growing
appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of
finding ground for a rational compromise between
individual rights and public welfare
. . . the question
is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as
against another, but of the use of reasonable means to
safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of
all depends. 30
Holmes points were: (1) that the nation could no longer afford rugged in-
dividualism, at least legally; and (2) that all private arrangements
were carried on within the context of the public realm, that is that the
health of the private sector was crucial to the public interest and
therefore to some extent subject to it. Justice Roberts in Nebbia vs.
New York (1934) pressed these points further by stating flatly that
"equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
31
regulate it in the common interest."
The implications of these cases as forced upon the country by the
catastrophic Depression pushed the role of public authority beyond that
of mediator between elements of a largely independent private sector, as
earlier described by Bentley. Now, as Gaskill recognized in 1935, the
public interest was seen to be attached to all commercial activity and
public policy, therefore, was regarded as the maintenance of that system
.
32
and those methods publicly agreed upon to regulate the private sector.
There were more than just traces of Bentley's ideas left in this new
perspective, however. As Bentley had been concerned with government as
a public arena in which private disputes could be arbitrated, Gaskill, too,
betrays a notion of government as referee, as an enforcer of rules.
15
Just as the public interest is derived from the under-
standing of the common welfare, so is public policy
the statement of procedure expected or required fromthe citizen body, conform,ance with which will promotethe common welfare. It is public interest reduced to
concrete terms.
By the end of the 1930's, then, a reasonably clear picture of the role of
public authority and its relationship to the private sector was emerging.
The public interest appeared to be an identifiable concept to be recognized
by public authority and put into action through public policy. America
was growing up, and there was a sense that it was growing together, that
maturity would mean a revision of the youthful ideas of "free enterprise"
and "private" activity. The laissez-faire or non-interference principle
was withering in the face of changing social scale and technological
developments. Progress, Justice Jackson observed, would come in the new
era through closer integration of society and through expanded and
strengthened governmental controls.
Pluralism and its Enemies
On the eve of America's entry into World War II, Pendelton Herring
remarked that, given a continuation of social stability and the desire for
increased economic activity, there was no reason why government interven-
35tion could not proceed to penetrate into the economy. The war, of course,
proved Herring's insight. Under a virtually nationalized economy America
was the Allies' arsenal, pushing production records sky high. The nation-
alization, however, was not accomplished by government take-over. To the
contrary, it was the private sector which joined the government in the
war effort. Countless advisory commissions and panels were established,
businessmen served without public compensation at various levels of
16
government, and combinations of industrial leaders set policies for their
own industries. Business and government leaders enjoyed almost free and
direct horizontal access to their respective counterpart sectors. There
is no question that the tie between public and private grew impressively
strong and, at times, drew the sectors into one another as Grant McConnell
, 36has suggested.
The War years, however, were cluttered with exceptions to traditional
understandings. At the end of the decade which had brought the most
all-encompassing war in history, it was time for a re-evaluation. David
Truman provided a perspective readily ascribed to by most of the scholarly
community of the early 1950's. The Governmental Process attempted to up-
date Bentley s vision of society as a cluster of interacting economically-
based groups by emphasizing "the moving pattern of a complex society such
37
as the one in which we live." Underlying this complexity, however, in
what Durkheim had called "norms and values" inhabiting the minds of the
citizenry, was what Bentley had defined as a certain sense of the "rules of
the game." Truman termed it a consensus on fundamentals such as the value
of the "dignity of the individual" and the ethic of "fair dealing" as verba-
3 8lized in such formulations as the Bill of Rights. Basic to this perspec-
tive on the American system was the idea of "compromise—not in the merely
logical sense, but in practical life—in the very process itself of the
„39
criss-cross of groups m action."
Where this theoretical brush with pluralism leads the discussion is
directly to a revised notion of policy-making. If the pluralist perspective
for the post-war years is valid, there are two significant consequences
which follow its acceptance. First, to use Truman's understatement, "the
17
attempts to harmonize group demands and widely held expectations may
produce a pattern of policy superficially lacking in rationality." 40 m
a consensus situation, public policy is again seen as an arbiter between
interests. Furthermore, the results agreed upon may make no sense to any
one but the immediate parties to the dispute because public policy had no
real goal other than the protection of the public interest, which is
embodied in those common elements formulating the consensus ‘in the first
place. Government as a leader as seen by Justice Jackson and Pendleton
Herring, then, was not encompassed by the pluralism espoused by Truman.
Second, an emphasis on compromise leaves little room for serious debate
on basic policy questions which further leads to a depoliticizing of the
system. If, in other words, government and the private sector are in
agreement about fundamentals, there remains but to work out details of
implementing the unanimously endorsed policy. The advisory committee is
a case in point for, again in Truman's words, it has the stabilizing and
efficient capability for "keeping administration out of politics by formali-
41
zing access and by restricting the area of controversy."
Two examples characterize policy-making within such a framework. In
1953, the new Secretary of Commerce, Sinclair Weeks, announced the creation
of The Business and Defense Services Administration to "see to it that,
while private business, of course, cannot dictate government policy and
plans, it can be placed in a position where it can effectively approve or
„42
disapprove of the implementation of such policy and plans. . . . The
second, perhaps more graphic example, cited by Henry Kariel, is the action
by the Alabama State Legislature providing that "the Medical Association
i(
43
of the State of Alabama ... is the state board of health." Both these
18
instances demonstrate a tendency toward the erasure of the distinction
between private and public. They further illustrate the identification
of public policy and hence public interest with one element of the private
sector, and in that rather limited identification is the test of pluralism
as a realistic model.
As early as 1940, Pendleton Herring disputed the value of the consen-
sus image of American society. "Utterly divergent economic forces are
seeking to use the financial machinery of the government to promote their
44
own ends." Other critics using the same social and political phenomena
offered conclusions about the American system which differed rather radically
from those proposed by pluralists. Ralf Dahrendorf, for instance, in 1957,
explained the existence of groups in society as stemming from conflict instead
45
of consensus. C. Wright Mills argued in the Power Elite that the ruling
power of society was not the balance of competing groups but the well-situated
class or corps of military and industrial leaders. Gerhard Linsky theorized
that groups with better access to government and subsequently more power
tended to maintain their power and thereby to sustain the status quo as a
kind of prejudiced pluralism.
^
The Post War Era
From the debate between pluralism and its challengers certain facts
emerge. The post-war era has introduced significant new elements into
the American system which, though seen from different perspectives, can be
agreed upon by most observers. The first is a trend identified and initi-
ally favored by Croly and other Progressives—the growth of technology.
19
Following World War I, both public and private sectors found themselves
relying on increasingly similar methods and machines to deal with increas-
ingly similar problems. The phenomenonof a burgeoning technology is
inextricably linked to a dramatic change of the scale of life. The nation
was brought closer together by the railroad, radio, air travel and tele-
vision. Attention had shifted from an occupation with daily local affairs
to a concern for national issues. Those few powerful groups which had
given Bentley and Truman grounds for their theories of an American pluralism
were competing with other previously unorganized or less noticed groups.
Strains in the societal consensus were giving more credibility to notions
of conflict as the social dynamic. Despite an emerging pattern of social
variation, however, the core fact was that especially during and since
the Roosevelt years, because of the combination of technology and a
change in scale, America was witness to a third phenomenon—centralization.
"Ideally," writes Kariel, "in the fully mature technocracy, efficient
47industrialization comes to mean concentration in decision-making."
Because more decisions emanated from a centralized source, however,
did not mean that the American system had been simplified. To the contrary,
the complexity produced by the rapid technological advances meant an in-
creasing interdependence among previously disparate elements. The auto-
mobile industry, for example, became dependent upon a great variety of
suppliers and subcontractors all across the country. Both depended upon
reliable transportation to ship parts, necessary raw materials, and the
finished product. A breakdown anywhere along the line, from the shipment
of iron ore to the steel mills, to a railroad strike halting delivery of
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new cars, could be felt by the entire nation. Michael Reagan emphasizes
the dimensions of the situation this way:
Interdependence, plus the size of individual producers,
give the latter power over the economic activity
.
of the entire nation. Thus, when corporate leaders say
that this or that must be done, because it will help or
hinder their efforts to maintain a "sound" economy,
/their words carry great weight
.
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Reagan's statement added to the discussion above thrust the commercial
sector into the forefront of American activity. In some respects, it is the
power and position of this sector that is at issue in the theoretical debate
between pluralists and "social conflict theorists," etc. There is no
question that technology, change in scale, centralization, and interdepend-
ence have changed the relationship between public and private power—from
almost complete separation as announced in Dartmouth, to government as
referee under pluralist-progressives, to government-commercial collusion or
joint directorship in the post-World War II era. It is the extent to which
this last stage has evolved that is not clear. When juxtaposed to the most
recent prevailing world situation, however, the nature of the relationship
is somewhat more understandable
. "In the cold-war economy that prevails
today, the national government is heavily dependent upon business corpora-
tions in fulfilling the most basic of all government responsibilities
—
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national survival." From the example of the automobile industry, it
can be cogently argued that the "business corporations" to which Reagan
refers are not just the defense industries, but the entire corporate
structure which supports them. This is to suggest, then, that it is
actually the commercial sector upon which the health and well-being of
the nation is hinged, which in turn implies a secondary position for the
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public sector. "When we come to examine business' position in relation
to government, the first fact that emerges," contends Reagan, "is govern-
ment's dependence on business.
What is indisputable about this claim is the importance of the com-
mercial sector to the entire American system. What is disturbing about it
is its relegation of public authority to virtual spectator status. Because
the nation is dependent upon the corporate structure for its well-being or
even perhaps its survival, surely does not mean that it is the corporate
structure itself which actually makes public policy, directs public authority,
and, in fact, is the embodiment of the public interest. There are those,
however, who believe just that. The most famous perhaps is Herbert Marcuse
whose theory of unconscious repression by and submission to the technologi-
cal state is worth examining if the importance of the commercial sector
is held above others. Kariel gives a somewhat more gentle interpretation
of basically the same phenomenon.
As its [the corporation's] millions of day to day decisions
take cumulative effect, it manages to reshape the physical
foundations, the emotional dispositions, and, ultimately,
the political ideology of the American community. The
makers of corporate policy, by their ad hoc decisions,
suggest what is painful and what is pleasurable , attach
prestige to some forms of behavior and detach it from
others, and legislate the relative soundness of popular
indulgence and deprivations.
This image of social control is, to say the least, not the traditional
understanding of the way in which the American system operates. Even in
the heyday of free enterprise, when the railroad and steel barons exerted
a ruthless dominance over their competitors, there was a sense that there
was a higher court, and indeed there was. Munn , Mugler , the Knight sugar
case—all conscious decisions from the Supreme Court—did make a
difference
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in the system; they were controlling factors. The Fourteenth and
Sixteenth Amendments, the Sherman Act, and other measures of control by
Congress did affect the direction of policy in the country by changing
the operation of elements within the commercial sector to protect the
public interest. Now, however, Kariel, Marcuse and others push that heri-
tage into obscurity with a new perspective on the corporate world as the
ruling power. It may furthermore be argued that the importance and
dominance of "private" interest over public is not a novel concept, but
one that goes back at least as far as Hobbes whose remark regarding the
inimical effect of "the great number of corporations" was that they were
"many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the
entrails of man."
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Despite the vehemence of the imagery, these claims do make demands
on any contemporary observation of the relationship between the public and
private sectors. Some substantiation is in order. Morton S. Baratz lends
some credence to the overwhelming power of the corporate structure by
rather boldly stating:
At any time the federal government is in a position to
bail out the private managers of large enterprises situa-
ted in key positions in the economy. Moreover, the
dominant position of the giant firms demand that public
policy-makers avoid at all cost decisions which could
conceivably jeopardize the financial integrity of
the mammoths. 53
This brings what was becoming a markedly radical discussion back toward the
center. First, there is an attribution of responsibility noted here by
public authority for corporations in trouble. It appears that when a major
corporate concern is in financial danger, it is the government that is
the final resource—not some other private source. Second, Baratz notes
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that it is the "public policy-makers" who are making the crucial decisions
in these cases, and not business executives. Nevertheless, the thrust
of the remark is that the public ignores the private sector at its peril,
that the corporate world is able to bring to bear considerable pressure
upon the decision-making process; in other words, that the public interest
lies with the preservation of established economic interests. Edward S.
Mason underlines this notion by maintaining "that to suggest a drastic
change in the scope or character of corporate activity is to suggest a
drastic alteration in the structure of society." 54
If it is true that public authority's decisions with regard to indivi-
dual elements of the corporate structure bear on the public interest at
large, it may also be true that individual corporate decisions also are
"affected with the public interest" as more strongly argued by Kariel and
others. Reagan uses the automobile example to demonstrate that "the most
apparent influence occurs when developments in the private sector of the
economy compel complementary expenditures in the public sector" such as when
55improvements m vehicles require new roads, parking facilities, etc.
While still emphasizing the considerable power of the corporate structure
here, Reagan avoids the sense of wilfull public manipulation and "evil-
doing" that Kariel and Marcuse attribute to the managers of the private
sector. It is appropriate at this point to allow a spokesman from the
corporate world to participate in this debate. The following statement is
by W. B. Eagleson, Jr.
,
President of the Girard Company, and taken from a
portion of a letter printed in the Annual Report for 1973.
National forecasts of strong business activity with a
reasonable control of inflation have given way to doubts
and concerns about large Federal deficits, credit short-
ages and inflationary inrcads on the purchasing power of
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the dollar ... On balance, however, and barring a
major mishap in the execution of monetary and fiscal
policies by the Federal Government, we believe that
business conditions will continue to improve throughout
the year . 56
There is certainly not a sense of responsibility for public policy emanating
from Mr. Eagleson's remarks. In fact, the executive seems to be saying
that if the government will just leave things alone, the corporation will
be able to steer its own course. On the other hand, Mr. Eagleson does
betray a respect for public authority because if nothing else, it can
make things worse.
A summary of the development of the relationship between the public
and private sectors since World War II suggests that circumstances such as
technological development, a change in scale, the subsequent interdependence
of elements of the commercial sector and in turn the interdependence of
public and private realms because of the demands imposed by the cold war,
have projected the private sector in general and the corporation in parti-
cular, into a position of prominence in the American system. The degree
of power held by private interests seems to be debatable; but it is still
reasonable to assume that whatever power they do hold is focussed on or
channeled through public authority.
Post-War Public Policy
public authority has apparently responded to the assumption of a
greater public role by private institutions with three control-oriented
policies. The first is directed to enhance the characteristic feature of
the private sector, competition, and thereby prevent private interest
from becoming either a challenge to public authority itself, or from
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diluting the vitality of the commercial sector by the creation of a limited
number of widely held monopolies.
Reliance on, and protection of, competition in the
markets for goods and services has long been our
declared general policy, but of course it has also
long been subject to manifold exceptions.
. .
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The Sherman Anti-Trust Act is the most obvious example. Empirical data,
claims Donald Turner of Harvard Law School, appear to confirm the hypothesis
underlying antitrust policy, which is that at least some aspects of economic
performance are worsened when effective competition is absent. 58 Further-
more
,
the stimulation of competition has always been thought to be a more
effective policy than outright regulation of monopoly and oligopoly. Its
prime virtues, argue its supporters, are a healthier distribution of
and an incentive for innovation. However, "the prime requisite of
competition, writes Reagan, "is a large enough group of sellers and buyers
so that the individual producer has to adapt himself to price changes,
rather than have them in his control." The fact that the modern American
economy features major industries dominated by just three or four firms,
Reagan contends, means that a true competitive situation does not and cannot
exist, and that therefore competition-oriented policy is fatuous.
The second major policy attempt has been the regulation of the private
sector by agencies and commissions. While the Progressives expressed fears
that these organs of government would create a tyrannical centralized system,
quite the opposite has occurred. Earlier examples cited the attempted
erasure of the public-private distinction in the Department of Commerce
and in the State of Alabama. While the agencies were originally designed
to control various elements of the private sector, they have instead become
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their captives as is persuasively documented by Grant McConnell in Private
g2g.er an£ American Democracy . Donald Turner points to an even more funda-
mental difficulty in that the regulatory agencies have failed to recognize
that regulation is at best a poor substitute for competition. 0^ Lacking
the necessary ingredients for competition and assuming the irresistable
clientel pressure upon the regulatory agencies, this public policy cannot
be regarded as effective in protecting a public interest which is broader
than that held by the regulated commercial concerns.
The third policy is fiscal control. Taxes are, of course, an important
part of this aspect of public monitoring of the private sector; but the
fact that taxes are applied equally retards the government's ability to
more selectively manage the economy and thereby exert control in the public
interest. The most immediate influence government has with private interests
is via contract agreements. "When a business firm enters into a contract
with the government, the contract gives the government a handle for imposing
requirements that would be beyond its authority in the absence of the
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contract." Reagan points out two examples of firms put on notice in 1962
for noncompliance with anti-discrimination clauses in their contracts with
the government. While setting a general tone and example to be followed,
this policy lacks the comprehensive force required for genuine control by
public authority. A more effective instrument in this regard is the in-
centive of outright subsidy which:
... is also a time-honored characteristic of the American
political economy. A few numerous examples are the Re-
construction Finance Corporation . . . which primed business
for a generation; the Small Business Administration, which
has supplemented private banking capital in more recent
years; and the lead-zinc stabilization program of 1961, ^
which will subsidize small producers at least through 1965.
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To gain a subsidy, private interests must meet publicly determined criteria
and in some way be responsible to public authority, which gives this policy
a positive control of elements of the economy. Again, however, in terms
of a comprehensive, well-articulated policy for the regulation of the
private sector by the public, the government has, at least in the superficial
sketch presented here, failed to counter effectively the growth of the in-
fluence of various private concerns.
A fourth source of control is in the private sector itself. Because,
as Robert Gordon has observed, commercial enterprises are not democracies
with regard to the participation in decision-making by either workers or
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stockholders, any claim for control by the rank and file is invalid.
Similarly, despite Adolph Berle's sweeping statement that "history has shown
that corporations will conscientiously seek to anticipate public reaction
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before it finds expression in legislation," the value of public opinion
as a check on corporate activity must be regarded with a good deal of sus-
picion, especially in light of claims made by Marcuse, Kariel and others.
The only remaining possibility is the self-awareness of corporation manage-
ment; the possibility that it is aware of its power and therefore of some
concommitant responsibility. Eagleson's statement would not lead one to
believe this was universally the case. William T. Gossett, a former
vice-president of the Ford Motor Company, provides another perspective.
We find a new role and responsibility thrust upon manage-
ment, the adjudication of the conflicting legitimate
interests of the groups who are intimately involved with
the corporations. We find management learning to sit in
judgment upon itself in those relationships where its
power is preponderant^and not subject to ready control
or review by others.
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Gossett could have been speaking about government's role in relation to
conflicting claims by private interests, at least in terms held dear by
Bentley and Truman; but he was using political language to describe the
legitimate function of a private corporation—the words of Hobbes updated.
Not only is there a recognition of a public responsibility here, but also
a sense that it is welcomed and will be duly dispatched. A return to
Eagleson is instructive, for later in the Girard report there is allusion
to this same sense of corporate responsibility for public matters.
Since we are committed to the philosophy that a healthy
and growing community is vital to the success of a healthy
and growing bank, we have continued to provide financial
aid for many residential, commercial, and industrial
projects in our City and area . 66
Coupled with an understanding of the firm's impact on its social environment
is also the distinct awareness of self-help in assuming public responsibil-
ity. This goes deeper than simply maintaining a "good public image"; it
involves the creation or the influence in creating a totally friendly or
favorable "business climate," one in which the commercial enterprise can
continue to prosper.
The business of business, however, is profit. Social responsibility
makes grist for speeches, charitable acts, and community involvement; but
when profit is threatened this baggage is the first to be jettisoned from
the corporate craft.
When welfare or cultural expenditures are seen as "paying
off," they will be undertaken. When they conflict with
profit, they will be passed by. . . . The corporation
conscience is, then, a self-interested conscience and
^
hardly a reliable vehicle for achieving the common good.
The tobacco industry, as Reagan points out, is a classic example of a case
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in which a good "public image" is applied to a product which evidence
strongly indicates is inimicable to the best interests of the public.
The rather unsatisfactory summary of the response of public authority
to the expansion of private or corporate influence must show that it has
not developed a comprehensive policy. A good case can be made for the
absence of a competitive base among major industries, making government
attempts to stimulate competition doomed to failure. Government regulation
by agency is highly suspect, while selective policies of subsidy lack the
coherence necessary to maintain effective control of the entire private
sector. Finally, corporate self-control may be a significant restraining
force while profit holds out, but is a necessarily fickle regulator.
Summary
The first 125 years of the Republic's search for an adequate interpre-
tation of the public interest and the role of public authority vi a vi
private concerns was highlighted by legal sparring over the proper balance
between commercial and governmental entities. The Dartmouth College case
set the stage by declaring that a private corporation had the same legal
rights as an individual, with certain immunities against public authority.
For years thereafter, the precedent was tested, but a firm belief in a
free enterprise laissez-faire system was the crux of the American ideology.
Dissent grew, however, until the Great Depression forced a rather radical
revision, for which ample groundwork had been laid by such events as the
Granger cases (Munn vs . Illinois) , the Sixteenth Amendment, and the first
formulations of the theory of pluralism. Government took a more active
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role in commercial affairs, and vice versa. World War II led to a further
blurring of the distinction between public and private with the creation of
the RFC and other public-private bodies. David Truman used these develop-
ments as evidence of a new pluralism, a system in which various private
interests would compete for the attention and subsequent goodwill of public
authority. As the exigencies of immediate war receded, there were serious
challenges to the pluralist perspective—challenges which preferred a more
positive, goal-directed public policy to the "referee"
-mediator government
role of the pluralists; challenges which recognized the emergence of
previously unnoticed groups now making demands of their own. Empirical
factors such as the growth of technology, economic interdependence, and
changes of the scale of problems and the consequences of their solutions
led to an alteration of private economic and public political relationships.
The growth of the private sector, primarily construed as business,
began to outstrip government control, if indeed it ever really existed. The
image of the public sector increasingly at odds with the private may not
be entirely inappropriate. Private decisions encroached upon public res-
ponsibilities and public authority found itself concerned with decisions
brought about by the growth and complexity of the private sector. E. E.
Schattschneider provides a useful perspective on this situation;
The scene of conflict has shifted so greatly that the
government itself is now involved in a wholly new dimen-
sion of conflict. The unresolvable conflicts are no
longer carried on within the old governmental structure;
the new conflicts characteristically involves the whole
government in struggles with powers wholly outside of the
government. Today, the government itself competes for
power . 68
While the language may be dramatic, the point is a good one, and that is
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that with public authority on one side, battling to maintain its preroga-
tives and control and the private sector on the other attempting to expand
its influence, the public interest may have been lost somewhere in between.
Further complicating the issue or perhaps at the heart of it, lies the
apparent fact that although the two sectors are in opposition and in some
sense perhaps in competition, the distinction between them is increasingly
less precise.
The Task Ahead
As hasty as this review has been, it does offer some tentative observa-
tions and, more importantly, questions. First, in the context of this study,
"public" may be taken to mean that which has been traditionally the concern
of government; "private" seems to mean commercial. Control of the total
private sector by the public sector is not apparent (with allowances for
such selective cases as the postal service, the Tennessee Valley Authority
and a few other limited examples), while private control of public policy
must not be ruled out. There is, it seems, great confusion about what con-
stitutes "free enterprise." Finally, there is no clear distinction between
public and private, despite legal and institutional attempts to enforce
various definitions at various times. One explanation may be that the dis-
tinction is relative, that an economic decision is private until it affects
the public interest, a point which is itself open to question. Another
explanation may be that such a distinction in practical terms no longer
exists, and that, in fact, it is not that crucial anyway. Grant McConnell
disagrees
:
32
caref
a
n
tan
r
ce; nevertheless
.
it Is necessary to look
th t ri
ly
k
at
-
any Char”e in the location to be certaina the basic conception itself is not destroyed. 69
If the location is unimportant, why, then, is the maintenance of the dis-
tinction itself important? The discussion in this chapter has left only a
very crude understanding of the terms "public interest,"
"private power"
and public policy. while it would be inaccurate to equate "private"
with commercial in any comprehensive sense, economic examples do confine
the analysis of the public-private dichotomy within manageable limits.
Observations and conclusions drawn from such examples may not necessarily
relate directly to questions of public-private relations in, for instance,
foreign policy or in some aspects of civil rights. However, to the extent
that general concepts such as "public," "private," "public interest," and
"public policy" have any broad applicability and hence real meaning for
even a rudimentary understanding of American politics, selected examples
from one of the major areas of public-private interaction should provide a
valid perspective on at least some aspects of the political system as a
whole. Therefore, the second chapter will be concerned with a specific
example of public policy-making involving a private, profit-making corpora-
tion. The third chapter will attempt to delineate recent public policy with
regard to the private, non-profit sector. Perhaps with a careful look at
two disparate examples of the relationship between the allegedly public
and private sectors, a more precise picture of the contemporary character
of these general concepts and their importance to the American political
system can be ascertained.
CHAPTER I I
THE PROFIT SECTOR
One way to explore contemporary relationships between the public and
private sectors is to focus on one instance of their interaction. The
first chapter has been clear in suggesting that "public" has come to mean
government and that "private" at least in an economic context, tradition-
ally has meant commercial, profit-making enterprises. The task at hand,
then, is to observe government and business at close range.
Before the examination begins, it is important to clarify this tradi-
tional understanding and perhaps to bring it up to date. It may be col-
loquially correct to read "business" for "private," but it is not an
accurate translation today, even confining "private" to the commercial
sphere. As Hamilton suggested in the Federalist Papers
,
the life of any
nation is carried on from day to day largely in economic terms, but this is
not to define a rigid distribution of economic activity into that which is
governmental and that which is commercial. Economists Ginzberg, Hiestand,
and Reubens help dispel the conventional model of the economy which con-
centrates on the private, profit-seeking sector, by suggesting that a more
realistic model has three sectors
—
profit-seeking, government and non-
profit.^" They further point out that there are significant exceptions to
these categories in public utilities
,
defense industries and government
subsidized private enterprise. The fact that these exceptions are so
large adds to the justifiable impression that the modern economic order
is exceedingly complex.
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With this caveat duly registered, attention may again be directed to
the commercial, sector and its representative, the corporation, as the
most typical "private" element in the American economic system. To select
a particular corporation for study in its relation to public authority
requires a set of criteria. The corporation must be a profit-making enter-
prise of sufficient size and impact to have generated information about
itself. it must have been involved directly with public policy formation
rather recently and it must not fall into one of the special categories
generated by Ginzberg, et. al.
Several possibilities suggest themselves. One interesting study would
be to concentrate on the Price and Wage Board of the Nixon Administration.
However, besides the fact that this agency concerns itself with many private
enterprises, its own policies are still in a state of flux. The whole area
of public housing versus private developers is frought with interesting
possibilities, but again variety of encounter tends to dilute the impact of
example. The ITT "scandal" has definite implications of odd public-private
interaction but the ethical problems involved are perhaps more over-riding
than pure public policy considerations.
Out of the hat comes the Lockheed Guaranteed Loan case. This incident
concerns a large, profit-making corporation whose direct involvement with
public policy-making was the subject of much recent newspaper jourlanism,
political speech-making, and extensive congressional hearings. The objec-
tion that will be raised is that Lockheed is a military contractor. It
may also fall under the category of a "government subsidized private
enterprise." Both of these objections have substance, especially when
placed alongside Lockheed's long involvement with the Department of Defense.
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Ginzberg says of corporations of this ilk;
In many instances, the facilities that the company uses,
even its equipment and much of its know-how have been
provided by the Federal Government. These are not
governmental enterprises; but neither are they conven-
tional profit-seeking enterprises.
. .
.2
Lockheed's eligibility for this study, however, remains intact because the
subject in question, an application by the corporation for a federal
guarantee of a $250,000,000 bank loan, concerns a commercial profit-
making venture. In fact, much of Lockheed's case turns on its ability
to function in the commercial market with the manufacture of a wide-body
jet aircraft, the L-1011.
The Case
Prior to the L-1011, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had a distinguish-
ed history in military and commercial aircraft. The corporation's military
record, as recited by its Board Chairman, Haughton, is impressive:
Excluding the C5-A [giant military cargo plane] on which
there were disputes, Lockheed's composite record on more
than 12,000 military airplane deliveries since World War
II is very close to 100% compliance with schedule and
cost targets. Our workers, our supervisors, and our
managers take great pride in this kind of a record, and
they take even greater pride in the performance of these
aircraft which have helped to provide for our national
security during this period."^
Commercially, Lockheed's three-tipped tale Constellation—the beloved
"Connie"—was a staple in commercial aviation for years.
In the sixties Lockheed plunged into the weapons systems business.
The Corporation successfully contracted the Polaris system, acclaimed one
of the most well-designed and managed of the modem weapons systems.
Building on their engineering and political experience gained in the
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Polaris project, Iockheed also won the contract for the Cheyenne Helicop-
ter, proving that, as New York Times columnist Gilbert Blackburn has
suggested, there is more to dealing with the pentagon than technological
expertise.
Lockheed, unlike its competitors, had never before
managed the production of a helicopter. But Lockheed
writers knew the magic words the evaluators had been
tuned to expect words like "life—cycle costing" and
"maintainability reliability." 4
The next major corporate coup was the C5-A project, an opening night
sensation that laid one of the biggest eggs in the military procurement
business. The Air Force was in the market for an extremely large, long
distance cargo plane of rather remarkable specifications. Nothing like
it had ever been built. After extremely costly and competitive bidding
by America's three largest air-frame manufacturers, Lockheed, Boeing, and
McDonnell—Douglas
,
the Air Force's Source Selection Board announced the
winner—Boeing with a bid of 2.3 billion dollars. Lockheed had been the
lowest bidder; so low at 1.9 billion that the Source Selection Board had
regarded the quotation as unrealistic and a not-very-subtle piece of
competitive bidding. Undaunted, Lockheed and its friends applied pressure
in the right places and, as Berkeley Rice reports in the New York Times
on May 9, 1971, shortly thereafter the Air Force Selection Board was
I
over-ruled by "top Pentagon officials." Lockheed was awarded the contract.'
But the top Pentagon officials bought a lemon. The Defense Depart-
ment's insistence on a new purchasing technique, the "package procurement
procedure" made conscientious technological development extremely difficult
because it demanded that, among other things, production accompany develop-
ment. Treasury Secretary Connally described this unfortunate system and
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its effects before the Senate Banking Committee during the Lockheed loan
guarantee hearings.
During 1969 and 1970, a series of adverse events arose in-
volving several of Lockheed's major military programs,
leading to major contractual and financial legal disputes.
The common ingredient in three of the four programs . . .
is a total package procurement procedure, which required
that development be undertaken under a fixed price type
contract with concurrent production commitments with
respect to price, schedule, and performance. We tried
mutually to make it work, but in hindsight it turned out
not to be workable and is no longer being used on new
programs .
^
Confirming Conally's admission, Gilbert Blackburn has shown the tremendous
increase in the cost of military hardware in an article in the New York
7
Times entitled: "Soaring Defense Costs: Blame it on the System." The
table below demonstrates that the costs of modern weapons "systems" has
far outstripped previous procurement.
Table II - A
Comparative Costs of Military Equipment
Original Equipment
McDonnell-Douglas
,
F-4 Phantom: $4 mil.
Chrysler Mark 60 Tank, $343,000
Destroyer, mid 60s, less than
$40 million
Replacement
Grumman Tomcat, $13 mil.
GM, MBT-70 $1 mil. plus
Litton' s new Spruance class
destroyer
1969 est. - $60 million
1973 est. - $100 million
Cost over-runs and expanding budgets are now commonplace in the business,
but Lockheed was the first to be trapped by "the system." Lockheed claims
that hindsight should not be used to judge the wisdom of their eagerness
to participate in the C5-A project.
With today's knowledge of the inflation that began almost
before the ink was dry on the C5-A contract, that the
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quantity of C5-As ordered would be reduced (from 115 to
81)
,
and that the protective clauses of the contract would
not be available to us because of differing legal inter-
pretations, some people might say we should not have gone
for the C5-A program. In 1965 we did not know those things.
^-td Lockheed s competitor who was bidding for the same
business, under the same contract terms and with the same
expectation of Air Force planning. 8
Things did not get better for Lockheed or the Air Force. In March of 1970,
Lockheed's board chairman asked the Pentagon for $200 million to bolster
the C5-A budget and threatened that without it, the Air Force would get no
airplanes. Assistant Secretary of Defense Packard then asked Congress
for a "contingency fund" which was quietly granted. 9
It was under these trying economic conditions, brought on by Lockheed's
relationship with the military, that the corporation decided to buy its
way out of bondage to the Pentagon by entering the commercial air-frame
business. The airline companies had let it be known that they would be
interested in a new design for a wide-bodied, medium range passenger plane.
Boeing had just committed itself to the longer haul 747 and McDonnell-
Douglas had no plans for such a project. The market was ripe and Lockheed
decided to take the opportunity to diversify. On the basis of a favorable
reception by the airlines of its initial design, Lockheed was able to secure
enough bank loans to begin what would be known as its L-1011 Tristar. The
market was good; in fact, by June of 1971, when the congressional hearings
began on the loan guarantee, Lockheed had orders for 178 Tristars, of
which 103 were firm. These sales, said Haughton, would generate enough
cash flow to pay off loans and finance additional planes. By the 255th
plane, the corporation would be breaking even. These were the projections
in June of 1971.
39
In February of the same year, however, Lockheed had been shocked by
an event which jeopardized its entire project. On February 1, Haughton
and a party of Lockheed executives flew to London for a last round of
talks with the Rolls-Royce people, who had agreed to build the engines for
the L-1011. On February 2, Rolls announced that it was broke and was
going into receivership; its contract with Lockheed was void. Lockheed
turned quickly to General Electric and Pratt and Whitney whose original
test engines Lockheed had rejected in favor of Rolls Royce's. After ex-
tensive new tests and over a million dollars more in testing expense, the
two domestic engines were again rejected. Meanwhile, Lockheed's creditors
cancelled $5 million in loans. 11
In May of 1971 Rolls-Royce was reorganized (under the management of
Her Majesty's Government) but would not agree to proceed with the Lockheed
project until Lockheed was guaranteed funding by someone. Lockheed turned
•to the consortium of twenty-four banks who first increased their loan from
12 13$350 to $600 million and then granted the corporation $50 million more.
It was not enough to give Rolls-Royce the confidence to proceed. Rolls
would not fulfill the contract unless Lockheed's loans were guaranteed by
the American government. The banks concurred and added the condition of
support from prospective airline customers. Treasury Secretary Connally
explained it to the Senate hearing:
It was made eminently clear by the banks that there are
two essential elements to their providing . . . addition-
al financing. One is guarantee support from the U.S.
government for any advances beyond the $400 million
level. The other is participation by L-1011 customers
to assist in the financing of the Tristar program. . . .
The government guarantee is the key to activating now
only the credit agreement, but also the other interrelated
conditional agreements with Rolls-Royce and with the
airlines. 14
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The U. S. Government was thus the last resort for Lockheed. Without the
government's guarantee of $250 million in bank loans, neither Rolls-Royce,
the banks, nor the airlines would risk investment in the L-1011 project.
Lockheed came to the government to arrange a business deal, not a subsidy,
or a hand-out. Chairman Haughton explained the guarantee this way:
We believe the government and the taxpayers stand a
minimal risk.
. . . the guaranteed funds will be used
^ relatively short period and will be liquidated rapidly
as the early aircraft are delivered. The other factor.
. .
is the provision for a prior lien on Lockheed's property,
which would more than amply secure $250 million in loans. 15
In support of the guarantee, Secretary Connally alluded to the consequences
of the corporation's failure.
For want of a relatively small amount of additional finan-
cing, it is almost certain that in the absence of Federal
guarantees the L-1011 program would be terminated and the
company forced into bankruptcy. The whole of the sizeable
investment in the L-1011 would be lost. The costs of such
a failure in terms of lost jobs, scrapped inventories,
finalcial hardships, and undermined confidence would be
very great. 15
This, then, is an outline of the "case history." It remains to be seen
what issues were at stake and what this encounter has to demonstrate about
the private sector and public policy.
The Issues
On the opening day of the Senate hearings, June 7, 1971, Senator
Proxmire of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, followed
the committee chairman's initial remarks with a set of questions he hoped
would be answered by the hearings. Among them were, why is the loan
necessary; if the project is too risky for the banks, why should the tax-
payers guarantee it; would the guarantee force the government into
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continued contracts ("sweetheart" contracts, as Proxmire put it) with
Lockheed to preserve its investment; and finally what precedent would
17the guarantee set for the economy? Senator Cranston was concerned about
the competency of Lockheed's management, and other members of the committee
wondered what other measures, short of federal help, had been taken to
ease Lockheed's distress. These were the issues attacked by the committee
and they offered an appropriate perspective on the case with regard to its
role as exemplar of a public-private relationship.
The first question to be answered was what made the Lockheed management
feel that a federal guarantee was first necessary and second, appropriate.
Certainly the unfortunate experience with "package procurement" had a great
deal to do with Lockheed's ultimate inability to finance its commercial
project. Too much of its capital was tied up in disputes over government
contracts, and outright losses in the recent past had been significant.
Here, Ginzberg's caveat concerning defense industries ought to be introduced,
according to Berkeley Rice of the New York Times . It seems that Mr. Rice
had discovered that "some of those C5-A progress payments (those [the
$200 million contingency Fund] coaxed from the Government under threat of
abandoning the project) may have been siphoned off to cover the development-
al costs of the L-1011 Tristar." Although the C5-A was built in Lockheed's
Georgia plant. Rice points out, government accountants estimated that
$181 million in C5-A costs (of the $200 million total requested) were
charged by the company to its California plant where the L-1011 was being
built.^ This is a serious challenge to the use of this case in a private
context. Under the guise of "two wrongs sometimes provide an acceptable,
however, it may be argued that if the government had put Lockheed in
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trouble with the original C5-A contracts, it was permissible for Lockheed
to use government money to get out of trouble.
In any case, it. is clear that Lockheed suffered at the hands of
"package procurement" and possible, although not so clear, that the company
may have received at least some compensation. The fact was that Lockheed
was trying to launch a commercial venture and was handicapped to some ex-
tent by its previous government contracts. W. H. Moore, Chairman of
the Board of Bankers Trust Company, one of Lockheed's twenty-four bank
creditors, put the problem in this perspective:
It must be remembered that this company has taken
$480 million in losses during the last three years
in defense contracting. This, plus the Rolls-Royce
bankruptcy, has made it impossible for Lockheed to
obtain the normal kind of financing.
There is no question that the Rolls-Royce bankruptcy and subsequent hold-out
f°r financial guarantees put excessive pressure on Lockheed. In fact, ac-
cording to the Lockheed people, Rolls-Royce had specifically asked for a
United States Government guarantee. A quick solution might have been to
drop Rolls-Royce altogether. But the alternatives had proved unsatisfactory.
General Electric's closest engine was bigger and heavier, and therefore
required structural modifications in the L-1011 airframe. The Pratt and
Whitney was smaller, but provided less power and was too noisy for federal
"noise pollution" laws. The Rolls-Royce engine represented several signi-
ficant technological break-throughs. The engine had fewer moving parts
than its competitors', provided more thrust per pound, and produced a
decibal rating significantly below federal standards. Lockheed felt
there was no choice.
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Senator Cranston had suggested that whatever the origins of Lock-
heed's predicament, it was its top management that had been unable to
extricate the company, and therefore should resign. 20 The company countered
by pointing out that it had taken rather drastic steps to correct the
situation
:
As our defense program disputes began to have an impact
on the company's financial condition, a number of steps
were taken to reduce expenditures beyond the normal budget
and manpower controls. ... Cash requirements were thus
$31 million less than originally planned.
. . Salaries
of key executives have been cut an average of 12%, and a
moratorium has been placed on pay increases for more than
30,000 salaried employees not represented by a union. In
January 1971, Lockheed sold for $9 million approximately
195 acres of unimproved land.^l
In addition, Haughton reported to the committee, the company had laid
off a substantial number of workers, such that by spring of 1971, Lockheed
was employing 27% fewer workers than at year's end in 1969. In short,
there was no hard evidence that Lockheed had been mismanaged.
Senator Cranston pressed his attack, arguing that even if management
had done a creditable job, the company really had no alternative but to
reorganize under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Laws. If nothing else,
this would, the Senator suggested, be a show of good faith on the part of
the company. But others prevailed in maintaining that Lockheed’s manage-
ment should not be punished for the errors of others, and that continu-
ity of management was more important than retribution.
The reluctance of the banks to finance the project was a persisting
issue dealt with most extensively in the hearings by the House Committee
on Banking and Currency. Chairman Wright Patman began the hearings with
the firm belief that the banks should be willing and able to finance
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the project alone.
The very best solution to the immediate problem would
be for the commercial banks ... to come forward and
provide the additional capital without a Government
guarantee or subsidy. ... The twenty-four banks
involved in the Lockheed loan represent almost one-third
of the banking assets of the Nation and it is their
responsibility to provide "venture capital" in just
such situations as these. “
Furthermore, Patman insisted, there was no reason to pressure the taxpayers
into taking the risk. There were no legal barriers, as far as he could
see, to additional credit being granted by the banks and if the banks
were so insistant about the value of the project, why should they not
make the loan? Another of Patman's arguments was that banks have accept-
ed "massive government subsidies" in the form of the so-called "bad debt
reserve" to encourage their participation in "venture" situations and
cushion them against the problems of making such difficult loans . 24 There
was, however, considerable confusion among members of the committee and
the bankers themselves as to the purpose for which the "bad debt reserve"
was to be used. Representative Windnall relied on the example of the
Penn Central to show that "substantial losses can be incurred, notwith-
standing prudent care in making loans (and that therefore) loss reserves
25
are to absorb the unforeseen losses that do and will occur." Repre-
sentative Johnson, a former Pennsylvania banker, pointed out that loans
over a certain limit were "classified" by National and State banking
authorities and that further loans to a company already holding "classified"
26
credit was against regulations. Bank of America's President Medberry
had already indicated that loans by the bank consortium were classified.
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The confusion stalemated representative Patman's argument, but
Medberry swept aside the whole dispute by focussing on an even more
public issue.
There is little question that the banks can make the
loan. We have sufficient funds
. . . But in view of
the enormous public interests at stake, we are con-
vinced it is appropriate for the Government to assume
a certain measure of risk.
. . ,
27
The banks viewed the issue as public, with the consequences of Lockheed's
failure bearing heavily upon public authority. Therefore, they reasoned,
the government should take an active role in preserving Lockheed. The
short answer, then, is that the banks claimed they were not afraid to
bear the risk of an additional loan to Lockheed, but that they considered
the loan to be in the "public interest" and therefore within the province
of the federal government.
The final argument for a federally guaranteed loan was based on the
sheer magnitude of the project to be undertaken. The point was that
modern technology and the demands of increased scale made it increasingly
difficult for any one corporation to accomplish a major production task.
This is becoming particularly obvious in the field of defense procure-
ment. Senator Brock came to this issue on the first day of the Senate
hearings by asking Secretary Connally, "aren't we getting to the point in
this country where our defense purchases are so large that they stretch
or even exceed the capacity of existing financial institutions under the
o Q
best of circumstances?" Connally responded with a hypothetical example.
Suppose, he suggested, a company has a defense contract for $9 billion
—
not unreasonable these days. If it runs even a decent ten percent over
expected costs, that amounts to $900 million! Someone then has to pick
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up that deficit. Even for the largest, most healthy corporation, that
is a lot of money. For the federal government, it represents a severe
budget challenge. The problem is no less significant in the commercial
sector. The scale factors are the same, the financing poses the same prob-
lems, and the resolution is just as difficult. More specifically, the
production of the L-1011 posed financial problems too serious to be solved
by one corporation already plagued by losses incurred in similarly scaled
projects.
Proponents of the loan guarantee cited some or all of these situa-
tions to emphasize the necessity of federal help for Lockheed: the unwork-
able Defense Department designed package procurement system; pressure from
the Rolls-Royce Corporation; careful management of Lockheed despite adverse
conditions; the reluctance of the banks to finance the project privately;
and the sheer magnitude and importance of the program taken on by one
private corporation. The precedents and justification for such aid form
the second and third major categories of issues involved.
John Connally opens the debate on precedents. Speaking to the Senate
Committee in support of the loan guarantee, Connally said:
One can cite many examples of ways in which the Congress
has authorized credit assistance to various sectors of
the economy. . . . federally guaranteed mortgage loans
at the end of the coming fiscal year are expected to exceed
$140 billion. . . . The Reconstruction Finance Corporation
played a major role in this Nation for almost two decades.
Small Business Administration loans and guarantees are
expected to reach almost $4 billion within the next year.
. . .
And, with reference to the Lockheed legislation in
particular, the V-loan program has provided many guarantees,^
through the Federal Reserve banks, to American corporations.
Lockheed's Haughton cited an article entitled "Why the Drive to Bail Out
Business is in Trouble" in U.S. News and World Report for May 24, 1971,
in which it was estimated that $137 billion was outstanding in federal
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guaranteed and insured loans (as of May 1971)
,
and another $54 billion
was outstanding in direct government loans. Haughton went on to point out
that $600 million had been committed in guaranteed loans and credits to
finance foreign purchase of seventy-one Boeing 747 's, and $190 million
outstanding to finance foreign purchase of twenty-nine McDonnell-Douglas
D.C.-10's (the L-1011's competitor). "These loans have provided for
employment instead of welfare," declared Haughton, "stimulation of agri-
cultural production—establishment of ghetto businesses—and a whole host
of other activities in the public interest. But we are told none of these
is an exact precedent for the Lockheed case—that the Lockheed case is
„30
. .unique. Anticipating a sharp response from Senator Proxmire, the Lockheed
people had researched the Senator's 1967 support (with Senator Nelson) of
a tax-amendment to bail out American Motors. At the time, Senator Nelson
had argued, "we will preserve effective competition in an industry that is
already highly concentrated ..." Senator Proxmire had added, "This is
immensely important to the biggest employer in the State of Wisconsin." 33'
Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, also listed
precedents but made an important distinction:
guarantees (now outstanding under different pieces of
legislation) apply to small business and small farms,
and they amounted in June of 1970 to $6.8 billion
outside of the housing field ... We have nothing that
can prevent a national emergency, a serious injury to
the national economy, from a failure of a large, well-
established and credit-worthy firm.^^
Bums' distinction was one of size. The government, he argued, has pro-
visions, and well-established precedent to assist small enterprises, but
no formal policy for aid to large commercial entities which, by their
very size, threaten the "public interest" with economic disruption
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should they fail. Finally, the "V-loans" were often cited by protagonists
of the loan guarantee. Since the program began in 1950, more than $20
billion has been authorized under this plan to help industries related to
national defense. 33 it is interesting to note that those who petitioned
the government for assistance for Lockheed's commercial project would cite
the V-loans as an applicable precedent.
Alan Greenspan of the firm of Townsend-Greenspan, Inc., appeared before
the Senate Committee at Senator Proxmire’s request to discuss the precedent
issue. Regarding parallels to defense related industries, Greenspan stated:
Let me immediately distinguish between any loans
. .
which are somehow related to defense production. Clearly
this is a wholly different question and one which relates
to the whole nature of our military structure and has
nothing to do with this issue. ... I think at this point
the fact that there is substantial disagreement among a
lot of us as to whether this is a precedent
,
clearly makes
the issue, at least at a minimum, an open question. There
is very little doubt that if this Lockheed loan is made,
any question of confusion on the issue is completely
obliterated. 34
Senator Proxmire, in spite of the American Motors incident cited by Haughton,
was on the offensive in his questioning of Treasury Secretary Connally. His
major concerns on this point were two. First, he was willing to make the
same distinction made by Bums as to scale, but argued that assistance to
smaller enterprises in the past not only did not set a precedent for the
case in question, but also that such aid to large scale enterprises did
not necessarily follow. "Mr. Secretary," asked Proxmire, "doesn.'t it
come down to this bill having our government for the very first time in
history, making a huge guarantee; Number One, to prevent a firm from going
bankrupt, one firm, and Two, to permit it to sell a product in competition
35
with other American firms?" His second concern was that because there
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were no prior policies which could properly be regarded as precedents for
the Lockheed case, there were therefore no publicly arrived at standards
by which to judge the merits of the case. Still addressing Connally,
Proxmire declared, "You say we have done it before, but we have also done
it under guidelines that were available to all comers who could qualify,
not for one firm."
Senator Cranston again invoked his solution of a change in management,
this time arguing that it would effectively discourage other imperiled
firms from regarding the lockheed case as a precedent for unqualified
federal assistance. The price of extraordinary public measures on behalf
of a private concern, he maintained, must be balanced by a concommitant
.
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sacrifice by the petitioner.
Professor T. G. Moore, Professor of Economics at Michigan State
University amplified an earlier theme suggested by Mr. Greenspan. Whether
or not there was precedent for granting the guarantee to Lockheed, if it
were granted, it certainly would set a precedent for other corporations
and that, Professor Moore insisted, would be bad.
If the Lockheed guarantee is approved, then the next logical
step will be to guarantee loans to all large financially-
distressed corporations. While the Lockheed guarantee is
alleged to be a special case, each corporation failure or
would-be failure will be a special case. [This precedent]
will reduce the size of the "stick" of bankruptcy. It will
therefore reduce the incentives for American business—at
*3 O
least "big business"—to be efficient.
While proponents of the guarantee maintained that public policy had accom-
modated such support for private enterprise in the past, opponents argued
that the Lockheed case represented a radical departure from public policy
and one which would set an awkward precedent for the future.
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As well as presenting the factors which in their opinion, made govern-
ment support of Lockheed necessary, and describing the precedents which
would make the guarantee appropriate, Lockheed supporters also were able
to provide skeptics with reasons why such federal help would be justified.
In the first place, there was a feeling by some that because of the diffi-
culties with government contracts, Lockheed had experienced, the govern-
ment was under some obligation to sustain the corporation. Medberry had
alluded to government's responsibility in protecting the "public interest"
involved. W. H. Moore of Bankers Trust strengthened that notion by sug-
gesting that the bankers had done their part for the project and now it
was up to the government to provide the confidence that the program required
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for successful completion. Mr. Medberry of Bank of America put the
matter most forcefully.
The package procurement plus other government contracting
problems contributed to Lockheed's losses of nearly $500
million on four programs. Without such losses, the addition-
al expense arising from the Rolls-Royce crisis would not
have necessitated the government guarantee. To a great
extent, the federal government shares responsibility and
thus the federal government has an obligation to assist
the firm through its present liquidity crisis. 40
Mr. Haughton shared Mr. Medberry' s opinion in this regard and added that
with the government's help, Lockheed would not only strengthen itself
but the market in general by re-entering the commercial field. Assistant
Secretary of Defense David Packard was sensitive to the difficulty ex-
perienced by former military contractors which attempted to expand into
non-defense work. So much of modern weapons systems development involves
highly sophisticated engineering, "pressing at the forefront of techno-
logy" were Packard's words, that these corporations very seldom are
imbued with the "commercial discipline to be able to take their resources
and move into non-defense areas." 41 Presumably, Packard was of the opinion
that package procurement waste should be condoned in the commercial as
well as the defense sector.
There are two major objections to the notion of government obligation.
The first is that the government had been pumping large sums of money into
Lockheed to salvage its defense projects. Just one previously cited
example is the $200 million "slush fund" assistance for the Georgia-based
C5-A project, $181 million of which the government guessed found its way
to California and the L-1011 project. The second major objection is that
Lockheed's management are big boys—they know their business and they know
their company. No one forced them into the commercial field. They took
a calculated gamble and because of a series of what some would claim to
be unforeseeable events, they lost. The Rolls-Royce squeeze play, for
example, was regrettable, but that is the risk involved in a "free enter-
prise" economy.
Aside from a proclaimed government obligation, there was an initial
attempt on the part of government officials to claim that the rescue of
Lockheed was vital to the national security. On May 7, 1971, when Secretary
Connally had announced the Administration's support of proposed legislation
to grant Lockheed a loan guarantee, he had cast the recommendation in
42
terms of "national security and the present state of the economy.
However, in his first day of testimony for the Senate committee on June 7,
Secretary Connally, lamenting the possibility of a narrowed airframe
industry, indicated that national security would not be in jeopardy with
Lockheed's demise.
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If Lockheed should go broke ... portions of it will
be sold off. The space and missiles division of it
is a very active, very prosperous segment of the entire
company; it would be bought by, I assume, one of the
other larger defense contractors and you diminish
your competition to that extent. 43
In response to questions from Senators Proxmire and Roth, Mr. Packard was
Quite explicit about the lack of any concern for national security rela-
tive to Lockheed.
Sen. Roth:
. . . should this guarantee be looked upon
as a cost of maintaining a viable defense for the
future?
Mr. Packard: At the present time, we have what I would
consider to be an excess of capacity in terms of the
minimum needs to support a production base for an
emergency. I don't see that we could justify necessarily
supporting all the present companies. 44
Government obligation and national security, then, do not alone offer con-
vincing rationale for federal aid to Lockheed.
A third justification is found in the claim that a strong commercial
Lockheed is necessary for the good health of a competitive airframe in-
dustry, as indicated by Secretary Connally above. Mr. Haughton suggested
that the preservation of such competition was in the public interest,
that with the bankruptcy of Lockheed would come "a de_ facto monopoly for
a single air-frame company and a single engine company in a $20 billion
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aircraft market.
Sometimes, however, market conditions dictate monopoly, argued others
such as Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Auto Workers.
... if there is a given demand for this kind of ship
and there is no L-1011 available then that demand will
be filled by increased sales of DC-10' s which are mainly
manufactured in the same area in which Lockheed has exist-
ed (thus absorbing workers) and using General Electric
engines (keeping American money in America). 46
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Mr. Woodcock's belief in supply and demand was undoubtedly enhanced by
the fact that both the manufacturer of the DC-10 (McDonnell-Douglas) and
the General Electric engine plant employed sizeable numbers of workers
belonging to the United Auto Workers. Lockheed did not. Nevertheless,
Woodcock had a point and that was that if there were real demands for
an L-1011-type aircraft, it would be produced by someone.
Mr. Jack H. Vollbrecht
,
President of Aerojet-General Corporation, a
small competitor of Lockheed's and therefore having more than a little
interest in the case, rejected Lockheed's concept of competition as some-
thing other than monopoly. "The only significant competitive discipline
in the aerospace industry," Mr. Vollbrecht asserted, is "the threat of
ultimate failure" which would be removed from Lockheed with the Govern-
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ment guarantee . Vollbrecht was speaking to one of the fundamental
beliefs of American business, i.e., that competition is built around
risk, and the essence of risk is the real possibility of failure. To
grant Lockheed government help would mean placing upon competitors not
the usual strictures of the "free" market but the burden of dealing with
a major competitor who was, in effect, subsidized by the taxpayers. Even
if the subsidy were not direct, the effect of continued confidence in the
company engendered by the government's concern, would place competitors
at a disadvantage. Senator Taft had invited an old friend and Ohio con-
stituent to address this issue. His guest was Edward Durell, the President
of the Union Fork and Hoe Company of Columbus, who added this for the
record
:
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My experience has indicated to me that bankruptcy and
corporate reorganization are needed just as much as
the profit potential to keep our business enterprises
productive. Without the possibility of profit, on the
one hand, and the threat of loss, on the other hand,
businesses will not have the incentive to increase
their productivity. Once we let our productivity slide,
we will not be competitive.
This debate has a familiar ring to it as one remembers the discussions of
"free enterprise" as traced through the courts and public philosophy in
Chapter I. A summary sentence on "competition" as a justification for the
Lockheed guarantee must note some rather striking conceptual differences
among the parties to the debate.
Another argument pursued by the L-1011's defenders was that, even
disregarding former considerations, the L-1011 Tristar was a product vital
to the interests of the airlines and America. One reason was that a
European consortium was building an L-lOll-type airplane for use among
Common Market countries. The Lockheed people relied on the fact that U.S.
airlines had chosen Boeing's 747 over a European rival for their long-haul
planes, and that, therefore, they would be inclined to favor another
American product, the L-1011 over a European competitor, thus keeping all
the economic benefits of production "at home." Secondly, it was assumed
that the L-1011, equipped with British engines, would stand a good chance
of competing for the European market. Finally, Lockheed's market predictions
showed advance sales, a good reserve of unconfirmed orders, and the promise
of even more orders after initial deliveries had been made. In short,
the airlines wanted the plane badly enough to help with the early financing
which should have been conclusive evidence that the value of the L-1011
was beyond question.
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But it was not. The assumption of the L-1011's value initiated a
spirited, if short lived, debate on "priorities." The first to challenge
the Tristar was Leonard Woodcock who, after reciting deficit figures for
the major airlines which had contracted for the L-1011, argued a modified
"planned obsolescence" theme.
The more fundamental cause of the financial problems of
the airlines has been their inability ... to absorb
the new generations of jet aircraft to which they have
committed themselves. It is no coincidence that the
largest airlines, with the latest and largest equipment,
showed huge losses last year while most small and
moderate-size airlines, which cannot afford to engage
in the expensive competition for the newest models,
did well. Clearly, new generations of aircraft are
being forced on the airlines faster than they can be
assimilated, at a rate that cannot be justified on the
basis of either growth of air travel or the financial
ability of the airlines to absorb them. 49
Woodcock went on to contend that the public interest was not in big air-
planes, but in other things such as mass transit, social problems, etc.,
which could use the energies and talents of the people employed at Lookheed.
Senator Proxmire had invited Ralph Nader to comment on the guarantee pro-
posal, and he was in fundamental agreement with Woodcock. What the airlines
needed, he contended, to meet consumer needs, was more "feeder line planes,"
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not the huge transports which serve as "surrogate liquor lounges." It
was Vollbrecht of Aero-jet who perhaps surprised the committee in his
concurrence with Woodcock and Nader. Casting the Lockheed debate in terms
of "principle versus expediency," Vollbrecht maintained that the growing
scope of public policy in fulfillment of social, environmental and urban
needs forced a greater need for "corrective action through self-discipline
in order to insure adequate Defense and Space programs at a price the
51
country can and will support.
"
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Despite Lockheed s claim, then, and the avowed needs of the airlines,
it is not clear that the L—1011 is a "vita]." product in any rigorous sense
of the term. This is not to say that its absence may not be felt, but
simply to cast a rather serious suspicion on the claim that the availability
of the product itself is vital to the national interest.
Throughout the debate on the Lockheed guarantee in the press and
in the congressional hearings, one issue stood out as being of paramount
concern to everyone—unemployment. Lockheed argued that the corporation's
failure would put at least 60,000 workers out of work at Lockheed itself,
and affect countless others employed by subcontractors. Treasury Secretary
Connally, in an early moment of candor revealed that his real concern
about the whole affair was the economic impact of the unemployment that
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would be created by Lockheed's ruin. Assistant Secretary Packard,
judiciously circumspect about most of the other considerations in the case,
was unequivocal about his concern in this regard. If Lockheed were to
go bankrupt, Packard reported to the Senate, "there will be a great many
Lockheed employees and a great many employees of the suppliers to Lockheed
affected. That is really what we are talking about and that would be a
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severe problem on top of an already depressed industry." Packard pointed
out that even if employees shifted to McDonnell-Douglas , as Woodcock had
argued, there would be at least some time lag and considerable non
re-employment which would have a tremendous economic impact on the West
Coast.
Meanwhile, Lockheed's employees were not unaware of their precarious
position. During the later days of the Senate hearings, a group of
Lockheed employees appeared before the Senate Committee with the following
57
petition:
PETITION FOR THE CONTINUATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PRESERVA-
TION OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY.
We, the undersigned, as concerned citizens do hereby submit
to the Congress of the United States, the following petition:
As citizens first, and potentially jobless aerospace workers
second, we sincerely hope that this petition marks the begin-
ning of a concerted effort to reverse an unhealthy, un-
American trend created by outspoken opponents of the indus-
try . . . These (opponents) are having a major detrimental
influence on future defense and security of our country and
all those industries which for so long have supported making
the American way the free way. . . . We urgently request
[approval of the guaranteed loan for Lockheed . . . which
will] help preserve a part of the industry which has con-
tributed and dedicated so much to the American way of life.~^
The flag, national security, freedom, and the American Way of Life were
never wrapped so tightly together. As early corporations had sought
protection from state legislatures in the Fourteenth Amendment, as steel
executives appealed to the government for protection against foreign
manufacturers and the preservation of "free enterprise," so the aerospace
workers defended public rescue of Lockheed in the name of the American
Way of Life.
The real issue, of course, was employment and there was no question
that a good many people would lose their jobs if Lockheed failed. George
Meany kept the flag-waving to a minimum and joined the public interest
to the Lockheed loan guarantee with employment:
The AFL-CIO has studied every argument against the
Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971. We have con-
cluded that its enactment is essential to the welfare
of America's workers and is therefore in the national
interest.
^
The idea that Lockheed employees were unrelocatable , however,
was not
Leonard Woodcock, for example, proposed that theconvincing to some.
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United States Government do for Lockheed employees what Great Britain did
for Rolls-Royce people. The British government did indeed let Rolls go
under, but they then stepped in and set up a government firm to continue its
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operations. The proposal met the same resistance that had dispelled
Cranston's fascination with a change of management—continuity of manage-
ment expertise was to be favored over an abstract principle of retribution
or total operation by the American Government which was ill-equipped to
perform such a task.
There were other suggestions. Professor Weintraub of the University
of California stressed the inefficiency of maintaining jobs of dubious
value when a redistribution of manpower would be much more efficient in
57
the long run. Professor Moore of Michigan State agreed:
Even if it [the L-1011 project] were [ abandoned ] ; is it
desirable to keep uneconomic projects afloat simply to
preserve jobs? This perpetuates inefficiency. If a
company is producing the wrong product, it is clearly
wasteful for the Government to aid it to continue toCO
waste resources and produce unwanted goods. 0
Two objections met this sentiment. First, despite previous discussion to
the contrary, the Lockheed people and their supporters obviously felt
that the L-1011 was not "unwanted goods." Second, Lockheed employees had
good jobs, and it was unclear where they could get equally good employment
should Lockheed fail. The burden of proof was upon those who proposed
the "relocation" of Lockheed employees, but who were unable to articulate
a practical plan.
To recapitulate, no clear policy emerged from discussion of the issues.
Proponents argued that previous government mishandling, the Rolls-Royce
bankruptcy, prudent but unsuccessful management, the banks' desire for
public confidence and the magnitude of the project made the loan guarantee
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necessary. Critics maintained that regardless of "bad luck," the public
interest in Lockheed was not sufficient to warrant federal help. With
regard to precedent, Lockheed people found appropriate analogies to their
situation in such government programs as the Small Business Administra-
tion, the V-loan program, the American Motors tax amendment of 1967, and
others. Opponents did not, and argued furthermore that positive congres-
sional action in the question at hand would set a precedent of federal
aid to large corporations without adequate standards to guide public policy.
Corporate backers provided justification for the loan guarantee with vary-
ing vehemence by citing government obligation, the Rolls-Royce bankruptcy,
national security, preservation of competition, the importance of the
product, and the threat of unemployment of national significance. The
opposition (and it is important to note that neither pro nor con positions
were solid in all issues in either the Senate or the House) believed there
was no government obligation, that the Rolls-Royce bankruptcy was unfor-
tunate but hardly grounds for a major policy decision by the United States
Congress, that national security was not at stake, that competition would
not best be served by government help for Lockheed, that the value of
the product was questionable, and that the unemployment problem could be
solved by redeployment.
These were the issues. What they have to do with public policy
and its relationship to the private sector is the subject of the sections
that follow.
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The Results
On August 3, 1971, Eileen Shanahan reported in the New York Times
the results of congressional deliberations. The "Emergency Loan Guarantee
Act of 1971" was passed by the House with a vote of 192 to 189 and in the
59Senate by 49 to 48. No mention was made of the Lockheed Aircraft Cor-
poration, but the understanding was that all of the $250 million dollars
in bank loans guaranteed by the Act would go to Lockheed. Other bills
proposing broader authorization, such as one by Senator Javits to create
a new Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and another by Senator Bayh to
create a $200 billion guarantee loan authorization for commercial and
non-profit organizations received little notice.
The mechanics of the Act were explained in the Times on September
10. Administration of the guarantee is by a three-member board composed
of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and
the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The guarantee
covers $250 million loaned to Lockheed by the twenty-four member bank
consortium. Lockheed is to pay an annual interest rate of 8 percent, with
more than 2 percent of that going to the government in the form of a
guarantee fee. The approximately 6 percent raw annual interest rate,
paid to the banks, is to be based on nine-month treasury bill rates, plus
three-eights of 1 percent for handling the loans. The guarantee loan
_
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agreement expires on December 31, 1975.
On March 2, 1972, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation reported a profit
of $1.9 million on fourth quarter earnings, compared with a $99.6 million
loss one year before. The corporation reported net 1971 earnings of
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$15.4 million, up from its 1970 defecit of $86.3 million. 61
On August 22, 1972, the first Annual Report of the Loan Guarantee
Board declared that the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971 had saved
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation from bankruptcy. 62
Trans World Airlines now announces with pride that it has the "most
comfortable fleet of planes in the world" and features the L-1011 in its
advertising. The Air Transport Association of America, a lobbying organi-
zation for the airline industry, explains the cost of airplane transporta-
tion in a pamphlet entitled, "Where Your Airline Ticket Dollar Goes."
Under a section labelled "Paying for Equipment," the ATAA has this to
say:
The part of your ticket dollar . . . which goes towards
paying for aircraft and for the wear and tear associated
with their use, accounts for seven of our [100] pennies. . . .
Since the 1930's technological advances have forced air-
lines to undertake a re-equipment cycle every eight years
on the average—meaning a new and better fleet of aircraft
and, in time, retirement of a predecessor fleet. The
latest transformation is taking place now with wide-body
jets—the 747, DC-10, and L-1011. 63
These are the more immediate results of the Emergency Loan Guarantee
Act—a prospering Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and an updated airlines
industry. The implications of the public policy formulated by the Act,
however, are much more profound.
The Implications
A crude sketch of the implications of the Emergency Loan Guarantee
Act must begin with the fact that it set a precedent which other corpora-
tions are anxious to follow. On April 19, 1972, Leonard Silk, in an
article entitled: "Why Overruns in the Defense Market?", reported that
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the Chairman of the Board of Grumman Corporation (E. Clinton Towl) had
requested $545 million extra from the government to complete its contract
on the F-14 fighter. Even with that help, Towl maintained, Grumman would
lose $23 million. Silk goes on to report that Litton Industries, having
been granted $600 million over renegotiated contract amounts for destroyers,
was now asking for even more money. 64 While these incidents involve
defense industries, the Lockheed example serves as a precedent. If Lock-
heed could receive federal help for a commercial venture, the government
would be obligated to ensure projects bearing on the national defense.
Describing Lockheed's subsequent "success" in the New York Times of
August 29, 1972, Representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin wrote:
While collecting much of its $250 million in bail-out
funds, Lockheed has continued its miserable performance
on the C5-A, sought a new $120 million bail-out for
some thirty uncompleted jet-prop transport planes,
collected more cash from the taxpayer via the Pentagon
this year than ever before, and encouraged two other
giant industries--Litton Industries and Grumman Aircraft
to begin lobbying for a spot on the corporate welfare roles.
Lockheed has taught Litton and Grumman a very practical
lesson—the way to succeed in the defense business is
to fail. 65
While there has not yet been a strictly commercial enterprise which
has capitalized on Lockheed's experience, the stage is set. One likely
candidate is the steel industry. On June 3, 1971, four days before the
Lockheed Senate hearings opened, Michael K. Draphin reported on a convention
of steel executives in New York City. His article in the Wall Street
Journal
,
"Steel and the New Industrial Welfare State," focussed on the
threat to domestic steel from foreign imports. Mr. E. H. Gott of U.S.
Steel, for example, made it clear that "it was high time for the folks in
Washington to quit concentrating on give-a-way programs for foreigners and
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instead aid domestic industries ." 66 Philip Block of Inland Steel said,
"We have every right to expect government help against unfair foreign
competition," and suggested such remedies as an "enlightened" tax policy
granting more rapid depreciation write-offs to increase corporate cash
flow and a "more progressive anti-trust policy" to permit or encourage
mergers and consolidations of steelmakers
.
67 m a sentence, the implication
of the precedent set by the Lockheed case seems to be that modern corporate
ogranization has perhaps outgrown previous public policy.
A second major set of implications has to do with the "priorities"
honored in the Lockheed case. The value of the product per se was not the
object of serious debate. A few people called it into question, but its
defense was limpid and seemed unnecessary. What was the object of great
concern to many was the survival of the corporation. Even then, its preser-
vation was not defended in earnest in the name of national security or
competition or any abstract notion, but in terms of the economic realities
of employment. It would not be unfair to suggest, then, that the outstanding
priority suggested by the debate on the Lockheed guarantee was the economic
immediacy associated with employment.
Third, should other major corporations actively pursue Lockheed's
course, the government would be hard-pressed to apply standards generated
by the Loan Guarantee Act. The language of the Act concerned itself with
the mechanics of the Lockheed case in particular, and did not include any
clue as to how future similar situations should be judged. In discussing
the possibility that the Lockheed case would set a precedent, Ralph Nader
had indicated that there are established principles which guide the govern-
ment's involvement in areas of health and safety; but that it was not at
all clear what goals the government should try to achieve for the public
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interest in matters of the economy which could not or would not be achieved
by private enterprise. 68 Senator Javits had offered some advice in this
regard when he introduced his own bill to the Senate Committee:
•
. * * the test should be the essentiality of the produc-
tion of the goods and services produced by the individual
corporation to the economy of the nation or of a region there-
of or the unusual case where the whole economy of the country
could be imperiled by one such stop. But I would not make
both tests, I would make either test. 69
There are three important parts to this recommendation. The first two are
in the phrase, "essentiality of the production of the goods and services.
.
.
"
Does the Senator mean to emphasize the essentiality of "production" or of
"goods and services"? He would probably maintain that both should be
considered. The third part of his statement is the implication that any
corporation whose scale of operation is so vast that its loss would affect
the national economy ought to be protected. At best, this recommendation
is vague; the priorities by which the standards should be developed are
not clear.
Arthur Burns was more precise and perhaps more realistic in his sug-
gestion. After stating his belief in free enterprise and the obvious
exceptions recognized for smaller businesses, homes, farms, etc., he went
on to say:
In extraordinary circumstances, however, even a large,
well-established, and credit-worthy enterprise may ex-
perience difficulty in obtaining needed credit, and
failure to provide that credit could be extremely costly
to the general public—in terms of jobs destroyed, income
lost, financial markets disrupted, or even essential
goods not produced. We should be able to find a way to
deal with this problem without injuring the free enter-
prise system. ^0
Burns, like Javits, suggests two criteria—the possibility of economic
disruption and the value of the goods being produced—but his emphasis is
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on the first. This comports well with the results of the hearings, which
seemed to develop a consensus on the importance of maintaining employment
and honoring credit agreements. In all. Burns' proposal
, formulated in
Senate Bill 2016 and sponsored by Senators Sparkman and Tower, had five
standards for granting a loan guarantee
:
1* Assistance should be given in "those rare instances"
where it is required to "continue to furnish goods
or services to the public, and where failure to meet
that need could have serious consequences for the
Nation's output, employment, and finance."
2. Recipients should be able to prove that the guarantee
is a last resort, and that there is "reasonable assur-
ance of repayment."
3. The guarantee should cover private loans, not outright
advances of public funds.
4. No new staff or bureaucracy should be created to handle
these guarantees. They should be authorized by "top
Federal officials."
5. A guarantee should be authorized "only if the President
certifies that it is needed to avoid serious and adverse
effects on the economy and a copy of that certification,
with a detailed justification is sent to the Congress and
the two Banking Committees at least ten days in advance.
There is concern for economic disruption and reference to the value of the
product. There are "protection" clauses about repayment and private finan-
cing. No new staff is created to avoid the possibility of developing a
"clientel" of eligible corporations. Finally, it is the President who
makes the recommendation for the guarantee, develops justifications, and
submits his proposal to the Congress.
Again, three aspects are strikingly important. The first is, like its
predecessors and the Lockheed case itself, the overwhelming concern is for
the economic consequences of the failure of the petitioner. The second is
that it is left to the President to develop a justification for the guarantee
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there are no guidelines to help him. There is the sense that the reasons
for the corporations dilemma are relatively unimportant; that eligibility
for a guarantee is hinged more on consequences than on cause. Third, and
perhaps most important, the issue is to be submitted to Congress for debate
by publicly elected officials whose deliberations are, the assumption is,
held accountable to the public.
A third suggestion for standard-setting is weak in comparison to the
Burns proposal but does emphasize less-well developed dimensions of the
debate. Professor Turner of the Harvard Law School deals with the concept
of government subsidy in general, and accepts its necessity when:
One, it is designed to promote activity which, without
subsidy, would fall short of the social ideal; and
second, beyond that, beyond the simple increase in
allocation, it does not affect the operation of com-
petitive markets
.
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His first provision considers the "social ideal," presumably conveyed to
public authority by elections and public opinion and enforced or activated
by the public's elected representatives. Turner is putting in conceptual
terms here what Burns had suggested in practical terms by having the
President submit his recommendation to the Congress. Second, Turner places
at least as much emphasis on a healthy competitive market as on the more
immediate economic repercussions of corporate failure, which is to suggest
that there is more to a stable economy than excessive regard for one
company's employees and their subsequent unemployment.
The final word, though, is that these plans were speculations, gestures,
which were ignored or set aside when the actual policy was made. Discussion
about consequences, ability to repay, etc., do not standards make. The
most important implication, then, is that other than the verbiage of the
hearings, the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act set no real standards (or
corporate petitions for public aid.
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In addition to implications of precedent, priorities and standards,
another area of interest emerging from discussion of the Lockheed case
is the use of the term "free enterprise" and its employment by representa-
tives of the private and public sectors. Professor Weintraub expressed
what might be referred to as a traditional outlook on the private sector
as free of involvement with the public sector:
Producers, not consumers or taxpayers, must bear the risks
of production if our economy is to remain free and viable.
* * • African political life has benefited by the separa-
tion of political and economic power. 73
There was undoubtedly some hyperbola to Professor Weintraub' s statement,
assuming he was aware of the plethora of government policies in such
periods as the Depression and World War II. Nevertheless, his point was
that free enterprise was "free" only insofar as it was responsible for
itself and could not rely upon consistent government support. Edward
Durrell, the garden tool manufacturer, expressed himself less simplisti-
cally, but betrayed every bit as much faith in the traditional free enter-
prise system.
Some people are saying that this scheme [the loan
guarantee program ala Burns' proposal] would be like
the old Reconstruction Finance Corporation. In my
judgment, RFC may have been appropriate where a
general depression existed, but it would certainly
not be appropriate where free market conditions are
capable of functioning as they are today. 74
Despite these testimonies, other spokesmen for free enterprise were somewhat
equivocal about its health and well-being in modern America. Georgia's
Senator Gambrel, in whose state Lockheed's C5-A plant resided, had to
68
hedge on the American free market ideal.
It seems to me we are not really in a free enterprise
context at all. We are dealing with a whole industry
(aerospace) that is, if you want to call it subsidized,
yet it is a necessary industry the U.S. Government is
the largest single customer for. 7
5
Gambrel thus lends support to Ginzberg ' s categories within a basically
three-sectored economy. There are exceptions to "free" enterprise, and
these are, the suggestion is, found in industries associated with defense
or public welfare, such as perhaps public utilities. Granted defense
and utilities, the Lockheed case has demonstrated additional incursions
into the free market concept. David Packard supports this notion.
I think if you really want to look at what has happened
over the past decade in particular, American business
seems to have gotten on a binge of wanting to be big.
Growth and size has been considered for its own sake.
I think this has caused a number of companies to do
things that were unwise in the long term.76
Packard's statement reflects an earlier discussion of size and change in
scale, the idea that perhaps some of the projects to be accomplished today
are too big for any one enterprise. Packard is not convinced by this
argument and hints that it is simply avarice and not the exegencies of
modernity which has expanded the scale of corporate operations. W. H.
Moore of Bankers' Trust, however, feels that regardless of one's attachment
to the principles of the past, contemporary problems call for more creative
solutions.
I work in and believe in the private enterprise system.
However, as our economy becomes more complex it is
critical that the private and public sectors work more
effectively together. 77
This is the same tune sung earlier by the steel executives, and even
earlier by farmers, exporters, the oil industry, and others. "Free
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enterprise" thus begins to take on new contours. In one sense "free enter-
prise" can mean government protection of domestic corporations so they can
compete with foreign sources. In another sense, it can mean government
subsidy or guarantees to corporations whose products or services are vital
to the nation, or whose failure would cause significant economic distress.
The common denominator seems to be the phenomenal change in the scale of
commercial operations. Bigness cramps competition and drains private capi-
stretches the seams of the capitalistic, free enterprise system.
I think the time may have come in this country when we
have to look at things somewhat differently from what
we have in the past. I am not sure that some of our
corporations have not reached a size and do a volume
of business that at least defies the ability of the
traditional lending institutions to meet their demands
.
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If what Secretary Conally said is true
,
and the Lockheed case certainly
lends force to the argument, "free enterprise" either has no real meaning
in the modern commercial sector, or its traditional meaning has been dis-
torted beyond recognition. The caveat may be that the reference is to
exceedingly large, and therefore few, private enterprises. The supporters
of the Lockheed loan, however, successfully demonstrated the dependent
linkage of subcontractors and satellite ventures to the primary producer.
"What is good for the goose is good for the gander" may be too crude a
formulation for such a sophisticated complexity as the modern economy,
but one is led to suspect that if the concept of "free enterprise" has
been significantly altered for major elements in the commercial sector,
the minor ones will certainly feel the impact.
This perspective on "free enterprise" and the commercial sector has
weighty implications for public authority. If independent corporations
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are no longer able to support their own activities, the assumption is,
at least by the steel and defense and now Lockheed people, that it is the
government's responsibility to protect them. William L. Cary, former
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and now a professor of
law at Columbia, remarks on this development:
Business talks about free enterprise but asks government
intervention in any financial crisis. The bailout of
Lockheed was a case in point. ... The real question
. .is whether the government should be thinking ahead even
further and first attempt to identify the industries
which may be sinking.
. . .
7y
It seems that the onus is on government to develop a public policy to
accommodate problems encountered by commercial enterprise in dealing
with the emerging scale and complexity of modern production. In a March
1972 article in the New York Times
,
Lee Loevinger writes : "the basic
issue is whether government should prohibit abuses or prescribe conduct,"
the former leaving to regulated parties great latitude, and the latter
forcing upon them "a very narrow range of choices
,
depending upon the
generosity, wisdom and skill in legal draftsmanship of the bureaucrats who
promulgate the regulations." Presumably, the Loan Guarantee Act was an
incident of "prescribed conduct" so narrow as to pertain only to Lockheed.
Besides balancing this difficult consideration, there are other
factors which would make control of an effective public policy in this
regard a difficult matter at best. One of the key developments of modern
life which is alleged to make government action necessary is the growth
of technology. At the same time, this dimension also circumscribes govern-
ment initiative in evolving satisfactory and comprehensive policy. What
has been called the "technological imperative" means, among other things,
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that government can not know enough about the technological problems involved
m production of various goods and services to formulate intelligent policy
either to assist or regulate the commercial sector. An example of this
dilemma occurred in the Senate hearings on the Lockheed guarantee. After
listening to a long recitation by the Government Accounting Office on
Lockheed's cost overruns, buttressed by reams of statistics and engineering
technical data, Lockheed's Haughton interrupted the government official's
testimony
:
But all these things you reel off about this airplane.
The GAO is a great organization, and a fine organization,
but I am not sure they know all that much about develop-
ing airplanes. 81
The question is, who does know? If only Lockheed knows, and it is the firm
asking the federal government to guarantee a loan of $250 million to cover
gigantic losses on a project which private financing will not cover, public
policy is based on little more than Lockheed's word that what it is doing
is the right thing. This, a reasonable man would argue, is not sufficient
justification for the use of public funds. Furthermore, the commercial
nature of these large-scale projects puts even more severe restrictions
upon public policy makers. Making the hypothetical assumption that elected
officials know something about "developing airplanes," much of the informa-
tion required to make decisions about government support is not available
to them because, the argument goes, public disclosure of financial and
technical information would endanger the petitioner's competitive position
—
the commercial version of "national security." Senator Proxmire was shocked
to find that, although he was being asked to authorize risking taxpayers'
money to guarantee a loan to a commercial enterprise, he was not allowed
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to study information related to the company's financial and technological
performance
:
Proxmire : If lockheed is willing to have you release
that Systems Analysis study, would you make it available
to us?
Packard: I don't believe I would, no ... I can't
manage that department [Defense] unless I can have
private studies that are not released to the public.
Proxmire: Ever? Under any circumstances?
Packard: I will make the decision. 82
In fairness to Packard, the study requested concerned the C5-A, a defense
product; but the information bore directly upon the L-1011. Furthermore,
company officials had already indicated that there was nothing "classified"
about the C5-A project. The point simply is that obtaining sufficient
information on which to base a decision by policy makers is difficult.
Another dimension to the issue of public policy control is simply
economic expertise. When and when not to keep a commercial entity alive
has heretofore not been a real decision, but was determined by events--the
free enterprise system. Government decision-making in this sphere not only
runs the risk of making mistakes, but of exerting undue influence upon the
"private" sector.
The judgment whether an enterprise is economically viable
. . . is one that ought to be made by the market, includ-
ing the market for private capital. . . . The increased
use of federal guarantees of credit expands the role of
political judgment, and, therefore, political influence
in the allocation of capital, and this seems to me clearly
unwise, both on economic and political grounds. 83
Professor Weintraub and Edward Durrell would have agreed with Dean Phil C.
Neal of the University of Chicago Law School.
Senator Proxmire sensed the political implications in using public
policy to regulate economic matters. He echoed Dean Neal's statement in
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agreeing with an earlier remark by Senator Weicker that the Lockheed
guarantee would permit a firm to survive not on the test of the market
place, but on the test of political clout ... it seems to me [Proxmire]
you just open up the determination of survival in the free enterprise system
to political influence and political thrust and power. . . . These
fears are justified.
From the discussion presented here about reasons, rationale, and
evidence for and against the Lockheed guarantee, very few arguments have
shown themselves to be decisive. But the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act was
passed, albeit by a thin margin. Why? Dean Neal and Senator Proxmire may
have foreshadowed the answer. Robert Samuelson reported in the New York
Times :
Immediately after President Nixon proposed the loan guarantee,
both Senators Edmund Muskie and Hubert Humphrey, who voted
against the SST, endorsed the Lockheed loan. The quick
reaction, some Congressional observers suggest, may have
been an attempt to sooth unionists, who lobbied strongly for
SST and also favored Lockheed aid.^
If this suggestion was true, and if it affected more than two senators, it
could partially explain Lockheed's success as well as lend credence to
Proxmire' s concern. Eileen Shanahan had reported on the voting alignment
of Congress after the Lockheed measure passed, but found no consistent
ideological or party pattern. All presidential candidates voted against
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it, except Humphrey and Jackson, who was not there. (This suggests
Muskie actually voted against it after initially announcing his support.)
The real clincher, and the fact that confirms fears about political
involvement in the economic process was the constituency alignment of the
Lockheed vote.
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The one pattern in the roll call was that Senators with
Lockheed installations or the plants of subcontractors
in their states voted for the legislation—those with
McDonnell-Douglas or General Electric plants voted
against it. 8 ?
Perhaps the most optimistic way to interpret these results is to conclude
that Senators were voting to maintain employment, that pressure from
large numbers of constituents persuaded them to vote for whichever side
of the issue their locality was on. A less hopeful, but possibly less
naive appraisal is that pressure came from the corporations themselves.
In any case, it would not be too far wrong to say that political pressure,
and not necessarily the merits of the situation, decided the Lockheed loan
case.
A third implication for public policy, aside from questions of control
and political matters, is the growth of what appears to be an expectation
of protection by government of private enterprise; that, in fact, protection
of the commercial sector is the job of public policy. Peter Drucker puts
the issue rather bluntly:
Government has a duty to protect ... It is unrealistic
to expect modern government in a developed economy to
return to the laissez-faire position of the late nine-
teenth century. . . . What we need, therefore, is a
commitment of the developed countries to a policy of
direct subsidy as against a policy of indirect protection
(such as tariffs or quotas which are hidden and do not
appear as expenditures of government—though of course
they are—expenditures of the community )
.
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This statement combines what has been said about the evolving concept of
"free enterprise" with the apparent need for a more active, comprehensive
public policy regarding the commercial sector. Drucker is perhaps more
direct than corporate spokesmen in looking forward to unabashed government
subsidy, but their anticipation is no less real. The term protection,
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one begins to realize, completely vitiates traditional understandings of
free enterprise" or "competition" and proposes a rather different role
from the mediating posture of previous public policy, at least as depicted
by "pluralists . " There are those, however, that maintain this conception
of public policy is not new, but is the norm. Lockheed's Haughton is
eloquent on this point, combining free enterprise, public interest, and
government protection into one statement
:
I think in loans of this type the greatest thing is whether
or not the granting of the guarantee or the loan . . .
is in the public interest, and have the applicants done
all they can in the private sector to take care of them-
selves, and then if they can't [emphasis added] we have
learned all our lives that the government is supposed to
do for people the things they can't do for themselves
.
All the foregoing implications of the Lockheed loan guarantee, from
precedent, priorities, standards, and free enterprise to changes in public
policy come down to reflect a certain understanding of the public interest,
a phrase used by Haughton on the one hand and Proxmire on the other. Like
"free enterprise," it is an illusive phrase, not easily contained, but
let loose to wander about the floor of Congress and to grace the pages of
newspapers. What does the Lockheed case have to say about the meaning of
"public interest" in modern America?
Crudely, it seems to be economic immediacy, a regard for the "is" of
modernity rather than the "ought." Senator Javits best expressed this in
response to a question from Senator Proxmire:
Now, we face a fact, not a theory, and we simply have to
make the best shift we can. So ... on balance the
virtues and strength for the United States, not for
Lockheed, of maintaining operations in Lockheed is greater
than the imperfections of a process by which they may have
to be maintained.
More specifically:
the function and operation of the country or a region
thereof, must be the primary consideration.
. . . The
fundamental policy point is the United States should
have an agency that is capable of looking at the liquid-
ity of a major enterprise, the operation of which is
essential to the country.
Boiled down, this means that the public interest, at least in the economic
context, lies in the survival of the major components in the economic
system. There seems to be no question of the importance of what and how
much is produced, as long as the economic engine is kept in tune. The
public interest, says Javits, calls for economic productivity, underwritten
,
if need be, by the government. If this is the case, and there is very
little in the Lockheed example to suggest that it is not, then it is
somewhat superfluous to cling to any pretense of "free enterprise" or free
market in the modern economy. The giant corporation, if indeed its sur-
vival is in the public interest, thus becomes, to some extent, a ward of
the state, and major corporate decisions become major public decisions.
The state then bears the responsibility of orchestrating the various cor-
porations and their activities in the "public interest."
In sum, planning is an unpopular word in this country but
no one seems to recognize that the actions we have taken
demand it. No one can be so naive as to say these are
not political questions. Yet when they reach the magnitude
of a half billion dollars for a single company the alloca-
tion of resources must be treated as involving major
questions of national policy.
If corporations are willfully surrendering themselves to the political
arena, they must certainly be aware that they will forfeit the right to set
their own priorities, to establish their own directions. What looks like
relief for major corporations and chaos for public policy now, could be
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the beginning of a radical change in public policy which could place private,
commercial enterprises in competition for public largess and support with
non-profit or governmental units. The complexities of Ginzberg's model
could be drastically simplified if the results of the Lockheed case are
writ large. Senator Birch Bayh's proposed amendment to the Emergency
Loan Guarantee Act should have been a major clue to the commercial sector:
I believe we can and we must
—
pose the question of
emergency loan guarantees as a question of national
priorities. ... I propose that the concept of federally
guaranteed loans on an emergency basis be broadened to
prevent the bankruptcy of major public and private
non-private institutions that provide crucial social
services to this nation . 92
Bayh s amendment did not receive much attention and it certainly did not pass
The public interest" this time was deemed to be in maintaining Lockheed's
economic capacity and the employment which it provided.
Another time, the priorities, the "public interest," may lie elsewhere.
Summary
The object of focussing on one instance of the relationship between
the public and private sectors in contemporary America was to gain a better
understanding of their interaction and thereby to clarify and perhaps bring
up to date some concepts very basic to the American political order. In
the first place, the study was hampered by the singularity of example—what
is true of the Lockheed case may not be exemplary of public-private inter-
action in general. Second, as superficial as the attempt has been, it
has revealed a tremendous complexity to which this brief glance could not
begin to do justice. Modern life, especially on the scale of corporate-
government relationships, is not a simple matter.
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Yet, with these limitations, the heart of the issue is relatively
uncomplicated and is instructive. It was not the purpose of this project
to judge the Lockheed case. Whether or not Lockheed "deserved" the loan
guarantee is not in question. What is at stake is some understanding of
the validity of the "public-private" distinction, how public policy is
made, and how public interest is defined.
3he private-public distinction is not clear, unless one defines it
by which side of the table one sits in congressional hearings. Neither
realm is separate and discreet from the other. The public presence is felt
in the private sector by regulatory policies, such as taxes, contracts,
employment regulations, etc., and the public sector must be sensitive to
those actions of the private sector which will have consequences beyond
private control. Indeed, when the failure of a corporation has such national
consequences that public policy is employed to avert it, any claim to "pri-
vacy" by the corporation is defensible only in the most legalistic, abstract
way. Reality puts the public-private distinction on a continuum on which
it shifts situationally . It is important that the distinction be recognized,
but it is equally important to recognize its relativity and therefore not
to make too much of it.
Public policy is seen to be a practical matter, an ad_ hoc
,
more-or-less
responsive, as opposed to initiatory process. Public policy may be regarded
as the response of "public" officials to "private" pressure, whether the
pressure is exerted by voters or by more compact units, such as corporations.
In a not very precise way, this perspective on public policy shows that
politics works—at least some people get what they want. In the Lockheed
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case, more people wanted to keep their jobs, wanted to maintain Lockheed
as a viable economic unit, than wanted to solve the unemployment problem
that would result from the failure of the corporation. This is not a
neat or very comfortable understanding of public policy, but it does appear
to be a fairly realistic one.
The "public interest" is invoked by everyone because, of course,
everyone has an interest and is part of the public. Unless one could
argue that the public interest was not served in the Lockheed case, it
must be seen to be as ad ho£ and "practical" as the public policy which
is enforced in its name. It is not a comprehensive set of standards, public
goals, or general understandings, but apparently is that policy or practice
which has the support and/or attention of the most influential people. In
the abstract, the public interest is the voice of all the people to which
government is supposed to listen and respond. In reality, it is more
likely many voices, only the loudest of which are heard.
CHAPTER III
the nonprofit sector
As Chapter II has demonstrated,
"traditional understandings," of
various aspects of American political and economic life do not always
measure up to contemporary reality. Eli Ginzberg, et. al. discussed in
The
.
Pluralistic Economy a model of the modern American economy as having
three major sectors, governmental, profit-making, and non-profit plus
significant exceptions. A quick survey of public attention to any model
of the American system would undoubtedly focus upon the governmental and
profit-making sectors. However, public policy must concern itself with
all of these categories, as well as their exceptions. To emphasize one
or two of these sectors at the expense of the third would mean that public
policy is incomplete, and would therefore suggest that "the public interest"
is not being served; that is, unless the ignored sector is in fact insigni-
ficant in terms of its impact upon the public at large. Unlike the second
chapter, where one instance was used to gain a sense of the whole, the
task at hand here is to explore, however briefly, the third, "non-profit"
sector in general to determine in some way its public significance and
subsequently its relationship to public policy.
^ fi^st observation is that most of the nonprofit sphere is also
considered to be private. This gives the lie to the more common notion of
equating private with profit, at least in the economic sense. Second, the
"third sector" is neither new nor insignificant:
It may be true that the key to our economic development
is in the dynamism of the private (equals "profit) sector,
but the historical record is unequivocal about the fact
that many
. . . nonprofit organizations also have long
been engaged in enterprise. The relative weight lof
this sector) is vastly greater today than heretofore, such
that one^may speak of a veritable transformation of the
economy.
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The nonprofit sector is a legitimate and major element in the American
political and economic system. What follows is intended as a general
description and critique of this sector, and a discussion of its rela-
tionship to public policy.
Defining the Nonprofit Sector
The defining characteristic of the nonprofit organization is that it
is tax-exempt. It neither pays taxes itself nor are those individuals or
groups which lend it financial support taxed on the money they give to it.
Public policy recognizes the nonprofit sector in the Internal Revenue Code,
Section 504(c)
3
by describing four categories of nonprofit organizations,
three of which may be grouped under the heading of "public charities."
1) "Organizations normally deriving a substantial part of
their support from public contributions."
Examples are churches, schools, hospitals. Individuals
contributing to such organizations may claim charitable
deducations of up to thirty percent of their adjusted
gross income. This percentage was increased from the
twenty percent indicated in the 1954 Tax Act in 1969
to increase income for charitable organizations.
2) "Organizations which
. . . receive a substantial portion
of their support from income produced in the performance
of their exempt functions."
Examples are alumni associations, symphony societies,
and some museums.
3) "Certain satellites of organizations in one or the other
of the first two categories" such as university presses,
trusts formed by a public charity and so on.^
That these organizations are defined as "public charities" has led to some
confusion about their "private" status. They are not underwritten by
the government, or at most only insofar as the government designs the
tax structure through which they exist. They are public in the sense
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that they are devoted to benefiting the public at large, but are not the
immediate object of public policy P££ se
_.
3
The fourth category of non-
profit organization is the "foundation" which is described by the Commission
on Foundations and Private Philanthropy as "primarily a grant-making or-
ganization supported by contributions from an individual, a company, or a
small group of persons (and) may be organized in the form of either a
trust or a nonprofit corporation; it may have an endowment or distribute
contributions for charitable purposes as they are received."^
A crude sketch of the nonprofit sector to this point, then, depicts
organizations which receive tax-exempt contributions from individuals,
combine those contributions into trusts, endowments, or other holding
mechanisms which are themselves tax-exempt, and dispose of their resources
for charitable purposes. The dependence of the nonprofit sector upon
the tax structure puts it squarely in the hands of public policy. As such
a long-held assumption has been that "charity" does not include politics,
and that no tax-exempt funds should ever find their way into political
activities. Stemming largely from the common sense notion that money
initially permitted by policies of the government to be devoted to "good
works" should not be used to affect those policies or the government
itself, this assumption has been codified in the Internal Revenue Code
under that section defining tax-exempt organizations.
That organization is eligible for tax-exempt status, no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying
on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legis-
lation, and which does not participate in, or intervene
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements)
any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for
public office.^
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Political parties obviously cannot be considered as eligible for tax-exempt
status. Section 504(c) 3 does, however, list sixteen legal components of
the nonprofit, tax-exempt sector.
1. Mutual Insurance Companies
2. Savings and Loan Associations
3. Trade Associations
4. Chambers of Commerce
5. Professional Societies
6. Farmers' Cooperatives
7. Consumers' Cooperatives
8. Trade Unions
0. Private Colleges & Universities
10. Foundations
11. Voluntary Hospitals
12. Research Organizations
13. Churches
14. Social Clubs
15. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
16. Museums and Libraries^
The great variety represented by this list gives a clue to the confusion
of the nonprofit sector, largely thought to be organized almsgiving.
The size and scope of this sector helps destroy that more parochial
image, however. Ginzberg is again useful in correcting the perspective.
There is no blinking the fact that in two out of the
last three decades the not-for-profit sector accounted
for the largest part of the total expansion of employ-
ment. Between 1950 and 1960 the sector accounted
directly and indirectly for almost nine out of every
ten new jobs added to the economy. 7
Ginzberg here speaks of the number employed actually doing the work of the
nonprofit sector. What they were doing was deploying resources which were
increasing at a faster rate than the Gross National Product. In 1968
philanthropic contributions totaled $15.8 billion, which represented an
increase of 155 percent from 1955. In the same time, the GNP had increas-
g
ed 118 percent!
All this money was coming from three sources. It has been estimated
that by the middle of the 1960's, approximately four to five percent of
the total philanthropic dollar was being supplied by corporations, which,
like individuals, are granted tax deductions for their gifts. Between
six to eight percent was coming from foundations, themselves nonprofit
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organizations which causes some statistical difficulties in computing total
contributions to philanthropy. Finally, the remainder, as much as 90 percent
of the total philanthropic contribution was coming from individuals either
directly or in the form of bequests, which themselves constituted eight to
ten percent of the total. 9 A summary to this point must note that there
are apparently a considerable number of people using a significant amount
of money to do what is loosely referred to as philanthropy. All this goes
on m the third sector, the nonprofit sector of the economy which is tax-
exempt and supposedly a political neuter.
A Brief History
While it is not crucial to the project at hand to develop an in-depth
historical profile of philanthropy, it is important to develop a sense of
the history of this endeavor in America to begin to understand its con-
temporary dimensions.
Marion Fremont-Smith attributes the modern legal status of institution-
al philanthropy to a precedent set in 1819 which, as she puts it, concerned
"an attempt by the legislature of New Hampshire to alter the charter of a
charitable corporation." 10 The importance of the Dartmouth College case
was emphasized in the first chapter as that legal act which set the stage
for the growth of private, corporate power in America. It is interesting
to note here, that not only was the case originally concerned with a nonprofit
institution, but it enabled the simultaneous development of the third sector
along with the commercial. The vital common element, of course, is the
distinction the Supreme Court made in this 1819 case between public and
private. Fremont-Smith interprets this distinction in terms of contract
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relations, as prescribed by Article I, Section 10 of the United States
Constitution
.
The Supreme Court held that there was an implied contract
on the part of the state with every benefactor who should
give money to the corporation. An alteration of the
charter without the consent of the trustee would be a
violation of this contract and therefore an unconstitu-
tional act. 11
Whether commercial or nonprofit and regardless of the actual merits of
the case, Dartmouth College successfully established a legal distinction
between that which is considered to be "private," and therefore free of
governmental or public influence, and that which more appropriately falls
under the immediate responsibility of public authority.
While the commercial implications of this laissez-faire oriented
decision were all too apparent to early entrepreneurs, the nonprofit sector
did not move as swiftly. A few sporadic attempts at organized philanthropy
occurred through the 1800' s, such as Jane Adams' "Hull House" and various
other localized attempts on the part of the well-intentioned to "rescue"
the morally indigent, wayward, or poor. But the big private-public battles,
and therefore what public attention there was, focussed on the commercial
sector and its struggle against local and increasingly national governmental
organs for autonomy and self-determination in economic matters.
A survey of the frequency of foundation establishment is enlightening
in gaining a sense of the quantitative growth of the nonprofit sector.
Before 1900, there were very few "foundations" in existence. Between 1900
and 1910, records show the establishment of about two per year. There
then begins an appreciable acceleration of the institutionalizing of
private philanthropy which certainly is not unrelated to the passage of
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the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. Between 1910 and 1919, an average of
more than seven foundations per year was recorded, with the bulk of them
coming in post World War I years. By 1919, there was a total of seventy-six
foundations in America, including the Rockefeller, Carnegie Corporation of
New York, and the Commonwealth Fund, still among the nation's largest.
Between 1920 and 1930, an average of seventeen new nonprofit foundation-
type organizations were founded. The number jumped to thirty per year
between 1930 and World War II. 12
A major change in the structure of income and corporate
taxes following the end of World War II led, in part, to
(what has been described) as a 'new wave of foundations'
sweeping over the country. In the 1940 's six times the
number of foundations created in the previous decade came
into existence, almost ten times the record of the 1920 's. 13
Why?
Some Reasons for Philanthropy
In the broad perspective, the motivation for the establishment and
support of "charitable" organizations has a noble character. Ginzberg
gives three reasons for continued interest in nonprofit organizations.
1. There is a tradition in Western civilization that is
rooted in the Judeo-Christian belief that the more
fortunate should help to care for their less fortunate
brothers.
2. The long-standing, general disposition to restrict the
growth of government reinforced the inclination of
citizenship groups to join together on a voluntary
basis to further important communal ends.
3. The knowledge of possible gains that groups of farmers,
laborers, employees, and others could achieve by banding
together for the pursuit of a common economic or social
objective.
^
These fraternal and communal impulses certainly deserve considerable credit
for maintaining the nonprofit concept from antiquity. For an explanation
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of the modern acceleration of growth, however, there must be another reason.
It is no coincidence that this acceleration began after the enactment of
the income tax laws in 1913. In short, a fourth and perhaps more powerful
reason for the increased significance of the third sector is that, charit-
ably put, donors were encouraged through the new tax laws to distribute their
wealth in such a way that would benefit society. Because donors can be
individuals or corporations, it will be profitable at this point to examine
briefly the motivations of each with regard to their involvement in the
nonprofit sector.
First, for the individual, the tax laws enable a personal redirection
of money which will be taken from him anyway; a donor can decide whether
he wants that part of his income which is "confiscated" to go to the
government or to some charitable" organization. From the standpoint of
public welfare," his decision will make little difference because, it
should be recalled, the definition of "public charities" was that their
benefits were to be bestowed upon the public. For the individual, however,
an earned sense of self-determination can be obtained in directing money
away from the public treasury. One critical factor of note here is that
the magnitude of wealth in question can determine the breadth of the
donor's discretion. In other words, "big givers" have more options and
more personal tax advantages in percentage terms than do smaller givers.
This is perhaps highlighted by the fact that less wealthy contributors to
private philanthropy give to religious organizations through tithing,
regular contributions of small amounts, and so on. The rich exercise a
great deal more "creativity" in their contributions to educational, medical,
and cultural concerns.^
There is more incentive for larger givers than for people of more
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im'ted resources. A person with an income of, for example, $100,000 per
year loses a larger percentage to taxes than does the person who earns
$20,000 per year. However, by giving away, say, 25 percent of his total
gross income, the larger giver is able to retain more net income and have
more of an impact on the object of his contributions, in 1966, those
people with incomes over $100,000 accounted for 8.9 percent of the total
charitable gifts reported. People with incomes of over $50,000 accounted
for 14.1 percent of the total. 16 This is to say that "big givers" are
vitally important to private philanthropy. Just how important they are
was revealed by data compiled by the Commission on Foundations and Private
Philanthropy, chaired by Peter G. Peterson in 1969. The Commission found
that of eighty-five large contributors, given the hypothetical situation
of no tax benefits, four percent said they would maintain charitable gifts
out of their tax earnings; 96 percent said they would reduce their giving
17
at an average of 75 percent!
There are other reasons than immediate tax advantage for making chari-
table gifts. Some of the greatest philanthropical contributions, such as
those by Rockefeller and Carnegie, were prompted by a desire to fulfill
some kind of social commitment, especially if that fulfillment had a poli-
tical concommitant
.
A clear majority of the big American foundations were
created by rich men who had the good sense
,
late in
their careers, to realize they were but one short
step ahead of either outraged public opinion, their
own uneasy consciences, or the tax collector.-*-^
Rockefeller, for instance, had announced that he was a "trustee" of God's
wealth and that it was only his duty as a middle-man to distribute his
wealth for the public welfare. Carnegie, the steel baron, felt much the
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same way and, rather than raising wages or lowering prices, built libraries
The souls of some of the great men of wealth were saved by others, often
in spite of themselves. Russell Sage, for instance, who did not believe
in parting unnecessarily with a penny, was immortalized by his wife when
she created the Russell Sage Foundation after his death.
One of its first projects was a blistering expose of
money lenders and userers, a study which caused the
New York legislature to pass laws forbidding many of
the practices through which Sage became rich. 19
Such eccentricities were soon replaced by more sophisticated under-
standings of the value of large-scale philanthropy . Henry Ford, who
despised the idea of "charity," of someone getting something for nothing,
was persuaded by his brother, Edsel, to set up a foundation which could
use as assets Ford Motor Company stock, and thereby keep the business
intact and in the hands of the family.
For the Mellons, helping the Oceanic Foundation find a
minds of extracting . .
.
petroleum riches has business
as well as philanthropic appeal. . . . Gulf oil is also
a major item in the investment portfolios of the indivi-
dual Mellons, their banks, and their holding companies.
Thus, the use of tax-exempt funds to finance research
in which a very rich family has a very keen financial
interest.
These particular "cover" uses of philanthropic organizations come under
the heading of "corporate collusion" and are an outright violation, former
ly of the spirit, and now of the law, of private philanthropy. This type
of "double dealing" was particularly evident in the smaller, family-run
foundations and is apparent in the amount of money held in assets versus
the amount of money disbursed for charitable purposes. In 1936 the
average expenditure per foundation was $117,000; the comparable figure
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for 1967 was $65,000 per foundation (and in dollars whose value has drasti-
cally shrunk in three decades). 21
A fourth individual motivation is ideologically oriented. A founda-
tion or other nonprofit organization is an ideal vehicle for the "non-
political promotion of ideas and/or fancy.
The "educational" foundations of the Left and Right
(witness Institute for Policy Studies versus the Freedom
Foundation) give the rich an opportunity to espouse their
ideological beliefs at reduced cost. Foundations are
also convenient for the "philanthropist" who wants to
pursue a hobby with tax-exempt funds [winthrop Rocke-
feller and his antique cars; James H. Rand (of Sperry-Rand)
and his "Public Health Foundation for Cancer and Blood
Pressure Research, Inc. — a spa in Stuart, Florida]. 22
Corporations controlled by individuals or families can be motivated
to make "charitable" gifts for many of the same reasons as individuals.
However, as corporate organization moves away from individual or family
management, other motivations come into play. As noted above, the total
charitable contribution from corporations is not overwhelming, especially
considering the wealth in assets of the corporate sector. This low yield
is understandable if one realizes that corporate contributions come out
of profits
,
not assets. When it is recalled that profit is the reason for
the corporation's existence, it is somewhat surprising there are any con-
tributions at all. In the 1960's, contributions ranged from .97 to 1.12
23
percent of profit which, in 1968, amounted to $925 million. There are,
in fact, those in the corporate community who regard business contributions
to nonprofit organizations as outside the purview and perhaps authority
of management. Peter Drucker, for example, feels that most shareholders
would rather see corporate profits stay in the company than be given to
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charitable organizations.
. . . corporate contributions to higher education for
instance, would hardly survive a reform under which
the individual shareholder again looked upon the cor-
poration as "his" asset rather than the property of the
managers . ^4
Not true, says John H. Watson III in an article entitled "Corporate Con-
tributions Policy," in which he reports that resolutions designed to
restrict corporate giving generally draw no more than five percent of
25the shares voted. Business conservatives have brought this question to
court and have been over-ruled. The court has said, in fact, that chari-
table giving can be in the corporate interest and has restricted its
0 A
approval to situations in which mutual benefit is apparent. Examples
are corporate gifts to university engineering departments, city recreation-
al or beautification programs, etc. Most of these gifts are viewed in an
environmental context which enhances the position and image of the corpor-
ation while contributing to the social matrix which supports it.
Gifts by private firms are justified not merely as a
matter of their indebtedness to the nonprofit institu-
tions for their past accomplishments, but also as a
matter of self-interest, for the deterioration of such
institutions as universities and hospitals who no doubt
have serious consequences for private enterprise .
^
Corporations find it easier to contribute to charitable causes if they
know other corporations are also contributing. In this way, a company
knows it is not the only commercial venture supporting the city’s parks,
or the Boys Club, or clean water; but that other corporations have a stake
in these things and that no one in the commercial community is getting
28
"a free ride." This consortium approach not only increases an individual
corporation's confidence in its contribution program, it also generates
92
more money for the community's social needs. In this way, both corporate
and public interests are served.
Motivation, then, can be broken into two general categories, regard-
less of whether the contributor is an individual or a corporation—genuine
communal or societal interest and self-interest. It is also apparent that,
according to the tax structure, one interest can help the other and there-
fore reinforce a coirmitment to the maintenance of nonprofit organizations.
Functions of Philanthropy
Given that nonprofit organizations exist, that they have a long history,
and that various shades of motivation support them, it remains to be seen
what they actually do. The mission of some is obvious—hospitals care for
ill; churches tend the soul; and museums and libraries harbor the cul-
tural products of society. All nonprofit organizations, however, are not
blessed with such teleological clarity. In June of 1959, the Treasury
Department attempted to dispel some of the confusion surrounding Section
504(c) 3 by making more specific some of the objects of what the Department
felt were charitable organizations. These included:
relief of the poor and distressed . . . advancement of
religion; advancement of education and science; erection
or maintenance of public buildings; lessening of the
burdens of government; and promotion of social welfare
by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above
purposes or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to
eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend
human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat
community deterioration and juvenile delinquency. 2 ^
All this is to be done without "influencing legislation" or abusing the
tax-exempt status.
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The Peterson Commission, established in 1969 just before what was to
become the 1969 Tax Reform Act which would greatly affect the operation of
nonprofit organizations, was somewhat more grandiose in its expectations
of what this sector could mean to the country. "Philanthropy," they
believed, "must bring a fresh understanding of what pluralism can mean in
30American life. Leslie Dunbar of the Field Foundation, has pointed to
two elements embraced by the Peterson Commission in its concept of pluralism.
The first is a kind of volunteerism, a sense of public participation in
projects of limited scale but considerable societal impact; an echo, in
effect, from John Stuart Mill.
We believe [writes the Commission] that a society which
encourages a sense among its citizens that they have a
reciprocal responsibility for themselves and for others
strengthens its own fabric—whereas a society which spurs
every man to live inland for himself alone weakens the
bonds of fratemity
.
The second element of the Commission's pluralism involves the creation of
a social "venture capital," a pool of resources to do that which is beyond
the scope or immediate concern of government.
Government should not venture to do those things which
private citizens and private institutions can do as well
or better [such as] spot emergent problems, diagnose them,
and test alternate ways to deal with them. ... In the
social realm . . . the consensus mechanism of the large,
established institutions of government are not always the
best and are certainly not the only way to innovate measures
that lead to orderly social change. 32
Waldemar Nielsen of the International Council for Educational Development
agrees that nonprofit organizations should not be conceived of as "simply
financial conduits to transfer funds from their own endowments to cover
the operating costs of existing nonprofit operating institutions," but
that they should vigorously seek a creative and initiative-taking role,
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pioneering new social ideas and experiments.
As a barometer of intent, it is worthwhile to examine at first hand
the stated purposes of some of the more nebulous of the nonprofit organi-
zations, the foundations. Remarks above about corporate collusion, personal
aggrandizement and ideological idiosyncracies may have left a rather dubious
pall on the social value of such institutions, and hence their tax-deduct-
ability
. Nowhere does an organization defend itself better than in its
annual report, and so it is these that will perhaps speak best for a few
nonprofit representatives. The first is the Commonwealth Fund, one of
the oldest of the great foundations.
Since its earliest years, the Fund has concentrated its
attention and resources primarily on the health and
medical care needs of American society. Currently, most
of its grants are to university medical centers for
broad programs to improve medical education and to
strengthen their leadership in development of community
and regional systems of health care. 33
This is typical of the more traditional of the large foundations. It accrues
wealth and parcels it out to impeccably worthwhile causes (other nonprofit
organizations) such as health and health education. In many respects, this
exemplifies the core of the nonprofit sector. The foundation serves a use-
ful purpose, it involves people in that purpose and it encourages innovation
in an incontrovertibly valuable field.
A more broad gauge organization is the Russell Sage Foundation, estab-
lished in 1907 "for the improvement of social and living conditions in
the United States." "In recent years," the Annual Report for 1970-1971
continues, "it has given primary attention to the application of social
science research to social policy formation in the following areas: law,
education and human resources, biology, social change , and the mass media.
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This is indeed an ambitious scope and one which departs from the traditional.
Its emphasis on "social change" etc., undoubtedly strains its tax-exempt
status, yet certainly fulfills a commitment to innovate.
Finally, the Annual Report for 1972 of the Research Corporation has a
slightly defensive tone. It is primarily a scientific research organization
which sponsors projects in "pure" science, a field whose popularity has
been on the decline in recent years.
Total funds for science are declining relative to our gross
national product, an estimated 2.41 percent of the GNP being
spent on research and development in 1972
,
compared with
3.04 percent in 1964. Only a small share of this is for
basic research and that share has been declining. Research
Corporation remains one of the very few national private
sources for such funds.
Again, the avowed purpose meets the criteria sketched above; the organization
is involved in an endeavor which is worthwhile, which complements public and
commercial activity, but which neither of the other sectors is prepared to
carry out alone. The important point here is that the nonprofit sector
can afford to be irrelevant, at least in the short run. The public sector
must address immediate public concerns, while the profit-making sector must
meet the market. This is true in "social" areas also; commercial enter-
prises may find no profit in developing a cooperative farm for former tenant
farmers in Georgia, while the local government agencies are occupied with
paving roads and providing police and fire protection.
However, the strength of independence from immediate public concerns
on the one hand and freedom from the demands of the market on the other
lead to a set of fundamental weaknesses inherent in the nonprofit sector.
The one most apparent at this point is an inability to judge the value of
"products" of the third sector. In The Money Givers , Joseph C. Goulden
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gives an example of what he must regard as a frivolous exploitation of
the tax-exempt status.
If the Mellons are more interested in medieval tombstones
than in Pittsburgh poverty, and care to spend their money
studying 12th and 13th century church construction, that is
the Mellon' s affair. However, there is no obligation upon
either the Congress or the American citizenry to give the
Mellons tax-free dollars to finance their exotic interests.
^
The Bollingen Foundation is the object of Goulden's criticism here. Accord-
ing to its annual report, its major activity is publishing scholarly books
"which would probably not be undertaken by other publishers." Recent
titles have included Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period ; The Shrines
of Tut-Ankh Aman
; and Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy . A rebuttal to Mr.
Goulden's argument could place such obscure (if it is obscure) scholarship
in the same plane with some of the scientific tinkering sponsored by
Research Corporation. Another tact would be to argue that even if the
value of the contributions are not readily apparent, the money is better
spent on Jewish Symbols
. . . et . al
. ,
than upon more polluting industrial
development.
Such a rebuttal, however, would miss Goulden's well-taken point which
is that evaluation of the nonprofit sector is poor if it can be done at
all. He is more persuasive in discussing foundation productivity later
on in his book.
Proven accomplishments during the period [the last
half century] are as much the result of the law of
averages as of philanthropic skills. Proven failures
are as few, for so much of the foundation work was
done in that gray area of esotericism where success
is nigh indistinguishable from dignified silliness .
^
This point leads the discussion of the nonprofit sector away from its
objective and into its abuses. With this background behind, the task is
97
now to begin to sketch out the relationship between the third sector and
the public policy which ultimately provides its support through tax
incentives
.
Abuses of Philanthropy
Money and morality usually do not mix well, and it was reoccuring evi-
dence of the truth of that maxim with regard to the nonprofit sector that
prompted Representative Wright Patman, beginning in 1961, to make a practice
of issuing highly detailed (and also highly selective) accounts of founda-
3 8tion misdeeds. Abuses were legion, but some were more obvious than
others. First, substantial contributors and their lawyers had developed a
spirit of "gamesmanship with the tax laws that resulted in donors, not
charity, reaping the chief benefits from 'gifts.'" 39 This was probably to
be expected to some extent, but certainly not on the scale suggested by
Patman. Second, there was an increasing misuse of corporate and family
foundations to provide pseudo-philanthropists with the privilege of tax
exemption to the disadvantage of competitors. As seen above, "payout" rates
of foundations in 1967 indicated a marked lack of commitment to expenditure
for social or charitable projects. A third abuse was a growing lassitude,
an inertness which was the product of more them "corporate collusion."
A board [of directors] with sentimental ties to a founder
or a cause, reinforced by strong financial resources, and
lulled by an unimaginative bureaucracy, may be substantially
immune to pressures to change.^ 0
Another reason for this lack of energy was suggested by Wolfgan F. Friedman
in the February 1957 Columbia Law Review.
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When a foundation bears the name of an operative enterprise,
any adverse publicity may affect the competitive position
of the "parent" corporation.
.
. . most foundations will
prefer to finance uncontroversial rather than politically
controversial fields of education and research. 41
Adam Yarmolinsky
,
of the Welfare Island Development Corporation, lamented
this lassitude as a waste of resources and the profligate use of a very
special place in society.
What foundations have is extraordinary freedom.
. . They
do not have to meet a payroll (except for administrative
expenses)
,
they don't have to sell a commodity, they
don't have to win periodic elections.
. . . Yet . . .
this is the most misused freedom in the U.S. today. 42
The virtue of independence is energy and creativity, and nonprofit organi-
zations have evidently not been expending that energy. There is bound to
be abuse in a system built on noble intentions; but when institutions of
integrity exhibit bad faith by a failure to deploy their resources in the
manner for which they were accumulated, it is only to be expected that
their independence will be sharply curtailed by external controls so that
funds flowing into the third sector from the second (commercial) via the
first (government tax policy) are not misused.
Accountability
If there have been abuses in the nonprofit sector, accountability
for them, despite the pressures and justifications or excuses for them,
must rest with the people who "own" or manage tax-exempt organizations.
First it must be noted that not all of the sixteen kinds of tax-exempt
institutions listed in I.R.S. 504(c)
3
succumb to the difficulties mentioned
above with regard to foundations. However, it would not be unfair to suggest
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that, in general, the management o£ and responsibility for most kinds of
nonprofit organizations has not been as efficient or as sensitive to evalu-
ation as it has been in other sectors.
One reason is that the nonprofit sector has fewer professional managers
Until recently it was not broadly recognized that managing a hospital, a
university, or a foundation was a unique endeavor and requires training and
skills somewhat different from the public administrator or the corporate
executive. In the foundation field, for example, as of 1971, there were
only about a thousand "professionals" in the nation's foundations, several
hundred of them clustered at the philanthropic factories operated by Ford
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and Rockefeller.
However, even if the number of managers were to increase a hundred
fold, it would not significantly alter the accountability situation.
More professional managers would perhaps make philanthropy more efficient,
but probably not more responsible. That burden lies with the institutions'
trustees, who are obligated under the law to invest and spend funds proper-
ly and to implement to the extent possible the founder's wishes. Again,
freedom is the essential problem to be surmounted by trustees of nonprofit
organizations. They are not directly accountable to the public at large
nor must they adjust to a competitive market.
The characteristics of trustee rule have a distinctly
monarchal cast: arbitrary decisions; secrecy, nonaccount-
ability for actions; lifetime tenure;
. . . aloofness
from public opinion; remoteness from the great mass of
people beneath his social and economic station and un-
awareness of or contempt for their needs—in sum, a regal
do-nothingness, nonmalicious in intent, but sorely waste-
ful of national resources through stifling passivity. 44
That there is truth to this stinging indictment by Joseph Goulden is
revealed in a 1970 statistic form the Foundation Center, a nonprofit
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organization designed to coordinate information for and about foundations,
which indicates that of the 30,242 foundations then on the I.R.S. list,
only 140 printed any kind of an annual report or financial statement.
^
It is not clear why this is the case. Nonprofit organizations in general
have nothing in particular to gain by secrecy, except perhaps quiet, but
the simple fact may be that because no one requires public accountability
it is not forthcoming.
Government control has always been exercised by a loose watch on tax
abuses. As earlier sections suggest, perhaps this monitoring has not been
sufficient. Yet, the dilemma here is that too much involvement can, in
the words of the Peterson Commission, "easily go counter to the basic
principle of private philanthropy and put the government in the anomalous
position of dominating a group of organizations that have, as a chief reason
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for being, the fact that they are not governmental." This implies that
nonprofit accountability must be sui generis
,
and must eschew any outside
control which might endanger the independence which gives the third sector
its unique freedom. The unique freedom, it must be recalled, is what
apparently leads to the abuses which make a discussion of accountability
necessary. Nevertheless, the Peterson Commission was remarkably sanguine
about the nonprofit sector's ability to put its house in order and to carry
out its tax-exempt purpose with an appropriate sense of obligation to the
public which ultimately dispensed its privilege.
Responsive pluralism requires the majority be willing to
place itself under a self-denying ordinance not to use
the weight of its larger numbers to crush the minorities
claim for equitable consideration and coexistence. It
means conversely that the minority is willing to place
itself under a self-denying ordinance not to use for
frivolous and vengeful reasons any veto power it has over
the desires of the majority .
^
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All this means that the problem of accountability, of abuses growing out
of mixed motivations, of a history of uneven development within the third
sector had not been solved by the time the Peterson Commission wrote its
report in 1969.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969
The Congress set about to tidy up what had become a very messy third
sector. Representative Patman, in early hearings of his House Ways and
Means Committee in 1969, declared, "Philanthropy—one of mankind's more
noble ins tine ts—has been perverted into a vehicle for institutionalized,
deliberate evasion of fiscal and moral responsibility to the nation." 48
He had been sounding this trumpet since early 1961, when he began to
decry some of the more blatant abuses of tax-exempt organizations, and
with the help of a few well-publicized indiscretions by leading nonprofit
institutions, had finally aroused Congress to action.
As previous sections suggest, governmental control of third sector
institutions had been minimal. In fact, they had been virtually ignored
by public authority.
A further measure of the freedom accorded to foundation
activity (other than ready incorporation by states) can
be seen from the almost total lack of congressional interest
in foundation activity before 1940 [the Rockefeller incor-
poration issue around 1913 excepted]. The inclusion of
provisions granting tax exemption to charitable enterprises
and charitable donations was rarely questioned during
congressional debate on tax bills throughout that entire
period .
^
Those days were over. Prompted by such incidents as the Ford
Foundation's involvement in the New York City school decentralization
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fight, its grant to a Cleveland chapter of CORE just before Mayor Stokes
was elected, the use of a foundation-type institution for the election of
Frederick Richmond from New York's Fourteenth Congressional District, all
brought questions from Congress. Among them were those concerning the
relationship of foundations to government, how public accountability could
be enforced, how much "creative," "innovative" freedom is appropriate, and
just how"public"or "private" foundations should be. The real question,
however, as Joseph Goulden contends, was the political threat posed by
nonprofit institutions, especially foundations, to elected officials, i.e.,
Congress itself. The Richmond case is a good example.
Frederick W. Richmond, a wealthy New York resident of that state's
Fourteenth Congressional District, had set up a charitable foundation in
1962. In November of 1967, the Richmond Foundation began making sizeable
grants to various, hard-pressed ethnic institutions in the Williamsburg
area of Brooklyn, also in the Fourteenth Congressional District. This
generosity coincided with the beginning of Richmond's candidacy against
Representative John Rooney in the Democratic primary. Congressman Rooney
cried foul and Richmond was brought before the House Ways and Means Committee
for violation of the Corrupt Practices Act. Richmond claimed his grants had
been made in the interest of improving his own neighborhood and that they
had nothing to do with his campaign. He finally announced to the Committee
this keen distinction:
There is no question that my political organization did
get as much public relations benefit out of those grants
as they possibly could, but the grants were made solely
and separately from any political activities I happen
to have had. J
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Congress would have none of it, however, and moved quickly to prevent
further political and fiscal abuses by the nonprofit organization by
passing the 1969 Tax Reform Act, aimed primarily at foundations. Among
the most important provisions of the Act were
:
1* The lmP°sltlon of a four percent tax on the net annual investment
of foundations. This encourages foundations to spend their assets on
program items instead of hoarding it for the benefit of the trustees or
the founding family.
2. The banning of "self-dealing." Foundations can no longer serve
as investment holding companies for their founders or trustees.
3. The establishment of a "pay-out" rate. Foundations are now
required to spend at least 4.5 percent of the value of their assets begin-
ning in 1972; 5 percent in 1973; and 5.5 percent in 1974. This provision
encourages more liberal investment and discourages stocks in low yield
family businesses and non-productive property.
4. The limitation of business holdings. This means, for example,
that the Ford Foundation must rid itself of all but 50 percent interest in
the Ford Motor Company.
5. The ban on "expenditures on attempts to influence legislation
through attempts to affect the opinion of the general public."
6. The forbidding of "attempts to influence legislation through com-
munication with governmental personnel except by written request. There
are other provisions which deal with even more subtle financial relation-
ships, but those above indicate the scope of the Act.
The implications of the Act are several. First, the small, desk-drawer
foundations will be hard hit, especially by investment tax and payout
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requirements. This is, in fact, exactly what Congress intended. Tax
advisory services now advise prospective foundation founders to look
elsewhere for tax shelters. As a corollary to this, the larger, well-
staffed, or at least, professionally managed organizations, will be able
to fulfill the Act's requirements and still prosper. Some of their
capital which otherwise would have gone into endowment or program needs
will now go to the federal treasury, but the effect is more one of moni-
tored control than economic hardship.
The second major result is that the same law which forces foundations
to be less conservative in their investment policies also forces them to
increase their flow of funds to recipients. The "payout" provision urges
foundations to budget more carefully, to find programs for the capital
they must get rid of, and therefore to stimulate activity in the entire
nonprofit sector.
These first two implications call for a third and that is increased
professional investment management. No longer can a board of trustees
depend on annual ad hoc decisions to rule their portfolios. Investment
must be managed so that the foundation can meet its commitments, increase
its capacity to do so, and stay within the law.
A fourth implication comes from Science magazine in which the editor
challenges the tightened political restrictions as a serious threat to
foundation program activity in that "almost everything worth studying, any
study worthy of foundation support might, directly or indirectly, influence
. . 52
a decision of some governmental body. " While the distinction between
what was and what was not political before made little difference because
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it was ignored, the new Act made certain that a good deal of attention
was focussed on the political ramifications of nonprofit projects.
Nonprofit response to the 1969 Tax Reform Act was strangely muted.
Foundations themselves made plaintively hasty and therefore weak cases in
opposition to it before Congressional hearings. The Peterson Commission
had attempted to amass data implying the superfluity of the Act, but the
more information it presented, the more congressmen and senators were
convinced that the regulation of nonprofit institutions in general and
foundations in particular had to be strengthened. "Public charities" did
not come to the aid of foundations because they were aware that the new
payout provisions would be to their advantage. The public did not rally
against the law because most of what it had heard about high profile,
nonprofit institutions such as the bigger foundations, churches and schools,
was that they had contributed products of dubious value to society. Why
support foundations which hoard money and campaign? Why support churches
which seem to do nothing to improve "the quality of life"? Why support
higher education if students and professors have time to demonstrate and
sneer at the non-academic world? In short, the nonprofit sector found
itself with no constituency.
Later comment on the Act by foundations reveals a varied approach to
accepting the inevitable. The Russell Sage Foundation, for instance, speaks
in its 1971 Annual Report in rather flat tones about "a comprehensive
Federal regulatory system . . . directed at preventing abuse of the tax
benefits granted to private foundations."
53
The Rockefeller Foundation,
in its 1972 Annual Report, uses the four percent payout mark as a measure
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of its increased commitment to expanding the program.
The n's payout in 1972 of $44 million represents all
of its income (net of taxes), plus $18.9 million of
principal, or 4.98 percent of assets
— $8.7 million
more than is required by Congress.
But the Ford Foundation is not at all happy.
^ particular current burden is the 4 percent federal
tax
. . . Since the tax falls upon realized gains as
well as on annual income, it has been especially burden-
some to us as we have been selling Ford stock.
.
We continue to oppose this tax and we believe that at
its current level the tax is proving much too high for
its proclaimed and accepted objective : to cover the
costs of proper federal regulations of foundations. 55
Two things are important about this statement. Taking the second first,
the "costs of proper federal regulations" are indeed substantially less
than the revenue received from the Ford Foundation alone; but this was
never a serious objective of the Act. Of more importance is the fact
that until the Ford Foundation liquidates all but 50 percent of the total
outstanding Ford stock (it has eleven years from 1969 to do so) it is
being hit twice; once by the investment tax and once by the "corporate
holdings" tax. This is, indeed, a big bite from the Foundation's budget,
and undoubtedly hampers its program activities somewhat. Nevertheless, the
Act is accomplishing its purpose—to wean the foundation away from its
parent corporation.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 marks the beginning of a new era for the
nonprofit sector which, it becomes more apparent, is hinged to at least
some extent on foundations. Schools, churches, etc. would undoubtedly
exist without grants from foundations, but it is the latter which are able
to amass great sums of money and allot them at the discretion of independ-
ent trustees. Foundations are, in effect, the brokers of the nonprofit
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sector. They take in money from the commercial, profitmaking area of the
economy and distribute it among
-public charities." Furthermore, because
foundations do have money and therefore discretionary powers, the would-be
recipients naturally tend to anticipate grant-making tendencies and sub-
sequently direct their requests into those areas which will attract founda-
tion interest. It was no accident, then, that the Tax Reform Act was
directed at controlling foundations. On the one hand, previous abuse of
fiscal policy had seriously undermined the rationale for tax deductions
and was therefore due for review. On the other hand, foundation innovation,
especially in social areas, threatened to politicize what had previously
been regarded as the most "private" sector of the American system and was
not to be sullied by or risk confrontation with public authority.
Hence the Tax Reform Act, some implications, a foundation response
or two, and an emphasis on the importance of the foundation to the
nonprofit sector. What remains is to test these images against reality.
What emerges are two significant problem areas
—
political and financial.
Political Problems
As early as 1946, Shelly M. Harrison and F. Emerson Andrews realized
that:
Foundations are clearly affected with the public interest.
. . . However carefully they may avoid overt attempts
"to influence legislation" . . . it is inevitable that
the results of foundation research will sooner or later
affect public policy. 56
Those who recognized this basic fact were increasingly troubled by what
appeared to be a conflict of interest between private foundations and
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governmental agencies in exploring various social problems, such as
racial relations, drug addiction, etc. Some attempt was made to wiggle
out of this dilemma by semantic tactics such as the Peterson Commission
used in agreeing "with those who insist that, in the field of public
affairs, education and not political pressure is the one and only proper
aim for foundation activities. ..." But this was an embarrassingly
thin quibble, and even the Commission had to bite the bullet when dis-
cussion turned to the tax-exempt status.
The very existence of the tax incentive for philanthropy
plainly means that charitable expenditures are not purely
private expenditures. They are made partly with dollars
which, were it not for charitable deductions allowed by
tax laws, would have become public funds to be allocated
through the governmental process under the controlling
power of the electorate as a whole. 58
That is the problem in a nutshell. Tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations are
public concerns because they use what for all intents and purposes is
public money. Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO and a
Peterson Commission member, seriously questions the wisdom of this procedure
and perceives it as justifiable only if the tax privileges "forward the
59interest of the public." Representative John W. Byrnes, during the 1969
hearings by the House Ways and Means Committee, labelled philanthropy as
a luxury for the rich in that they are able to direct their money into
services they can control. This privilege, Byrnes pointed out, is not
widely shared.
The vast majority of the American people do not have this
choice. . . . they must also pay a higher price to carry
on these services (public projects, some of which they
are not enthusiastic about) simply because some people with
wealth have said they do not want to support any of these
services. 60
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The issue is clear. Money which would otherwise go into public projects
can be directed, especially by the wealthy, to "private" programs which
have virtually no accountability to the public. Yet those who support
foundation activities and the goals of the variety of nonprofit organiza-
tions in general, contend in good faith that the maintenance of these
institutions is, in fact, in the public interest. The conclusion must be
that these tax-exempt organizations are "private" only to the extent that
they are not directly controlled by the public sector, which is to further
suggest that with regard to these organizations, any distinction between pub-
lic and private is more definitional than operative. A complete catalogue
of reasons for this peculiar state of affairs would be long and varied;
but the fundamental reasons are simple—these institutions live on tax
money and conduct projects which ultimately affect the public interest.
The Ford Foundation has been one of the first to realize the implica-
tions of these facts. McGeorge Bundy's 1967 remarks serve as a good
introduction to the examples that follow;
It makes no sense, in the last third of the twentieth
century, to suppose an arbitrary division between what
is done publicly and what is done privately. One of
the obligations of the private organization is, in fact,
to concern itself with the relationship between the problem
it is attacking and that part of the problem which, of
honest assessment
,
it believes is a_ part of the respon-
^
sibility of political institutions and political forces
The private organization, as Bundy perceives it, is a spearhead for public
policy, intimately involved in the same kinds of issues with which public
authority must deal. Two examples demonstrate Ford's commitment to this
idea.
After the racial struggles of the summer of 1966, America tensely
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awaited repeat performances in the summer of 1967. One of the potential
hot spots was Cleveland, a city which in 1966 had seen the death of four
people and the destruction of millions of dollars of property in riots
and looting, whites were moving out of the city; blacks were moving in.
in spite of the more radical direction the Congress of Racial Equality had
taken under the leadership of Ployd McKissick
,
Ford decided to trust the
autonomy of a local Cleveland CORE chapter, and grant the group $17S,000
for a smaller version of a program which had worked rather successfully in
Baltimore-training of youth and community workers, voter registration,
and planning for economic development. As Joseph Goulden suggests, this
was at once the bravest and one of the most naive operations ever under-
taken by a major foundation, it was brave because it backed a principle
with action ana real money. It was naive primarily because the voter
registration part of the program was approved exactly one month after Ohio
State Representative Carl stokes had announced his candidacy for the
Cleveland mayoralty, with Ford funds, CORE concentrated registration
efforts m mostly black districts. Stokes won the final election by slip-
ping past Republican Seth C. Taft with 2,350 votes of 257
,
207 .^
The value of other parts of the Ford Cleveland program was over-
shadowed by this political faux paux—and there is no question that it was
that. As a result, it is reasonably certain that tax-exempt funds will
never again be used for voter registration drives.
The second incident involves Ford's involvement with the New York City
school system. Studies had shown that by 1965, 85 percent of Harlem
school-children were more than two years behind other inner city school
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children who were white. One half of New York school children were black
or Puerto Rican, but of the system's nine hundred principals, only four
were black and none was Puerto Rican. The governing body for the entire
system was the Board of Education which had centralized and professionalized
the system, but had left no neighborhood voice in the way the schools were
run. In 1966 black parents staged a boycott of an intermediate school,
and soon the boycott had spread to other schools. The Board of Education
then invited the Ford Foundation to study the matter and make recommendations.
In the spring of 1957, Ford persuaded the Board to sponsor three demonstra-
tion projects where "experiments" with decentralized schools could be
tried and studied. Soon there were city-wide strikes by the teachers'
unions which outwardly protested new "pupil-student ratios," but inwardly
feared for "job security." Trouble continued through 1968 until, after
tremendous acrimony on all sides, the New York legislature apparently bowed
to pressure from teacher's unions and disbanded the demonstration units,
adopted a program written by the largest teacher'. s union, and decentralized
the schools in only the most superficial ways, leaving all key decision-
6 3
making to the central Board of Education. Meanwhile the Ford Foundation
had been vilified by all sides for "meddling," for injecting "outsiders"
into a "local" matter.
By the time the' controversy stilled, Ford was either bent
upon destroying society with tax-free funds, in the
opinion of the Right, or of fostering a "let-them-eat-
cake" scheme of institutionalized segregation upon Blacks 64
and Puerto Ricans, the theory of socialist Michael Harrington.
The incident, other than reproving the old tautology that hard problems
are not easily solved, left confusion about the role of the nonprofit
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organization. When summoned for assistance by a public body, the Board of
Education, ought Ford not to have responded? With public policy apparently
stalemated, what other institution or organization should have tried to
mediate the situation? The political power of the unions ultimately
carried the day; but does that not suggest that an "independent" perspec-
tive is valuable? This is not to say that the "people" or at least the
organized "people" ought not to be trusted or have their say, but who was
representing the black parents and their children who were not being
"educated" under the centralized system?
The value of both these incidents as examples is considerably decreased
when they are examined too closely. The most important point is that Ford,
in both cases, seriously stretched the anti-political clauses of Section
503(c) 3 of the Internal Revenue Service Code. There is no question that
Ford's behavior in both instances was political, that it affected
public
policy directly, and that its actions, along with similar actions
of
similar institutions led to a strengthening of the
anti-political aspects
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The question then is,
if these organiza-
tions are to fulfill anything like the purposes sketched
for them by their
founders, what are they to do? How can an institution
be an active, creative
force in society without affecting public policy,
whether that active,
creative force is purely scientific, as in
experiments with atomic energy
or communicable disease, or social, as in
experiments with education, group
life-styles, or the impact of technology upon
modern life? In fact, if
these institutions are actually underwritten
by public money, should not
their activities involve "public" concerns,
focus on projects which will
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eventually benefit the public at large? Taking the other side, if these
institutions are legally deemed "private" entities, "legal persons" as
are corporations, how is public control to be exerted over institutions
whose legal independence has been a sine quo non since the Dartmouth College
case?
The conclusion seems to be that active nonprofit organizations are
in a politically untenable position. The third sector is supported, in
effect, by tax money. Therefore, logically, it is the object of public
policy, of public control. Yet its status as "private" remains intact,
until its projects become too threatening politically, at which time its
tax status is called into question.
The Peterson Commission is of no help in clinging to its professed
belief in "pluralism." After examining these problems, "the commission
concluded, . . . that the public interest is best served through a strong
dual system of private giving and government funding as a means of allocat-
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ing resources for the general welfare." But the funding system is not
dual. All money is from the taxpayer and is directed more by tax policy
than by the free-will discretion of the citizen. Secondly, that money
taken in taxes is disposed of in ways increasingly remote from the control
of the taxpayer, while those resources allocated by "private giving" are
devoted to purposes highly circumscribed by the law. There seems to be
no way out of the dilemma. One aspect of it which needs to be seriously
examined, however, is the "private giving." Without it, there would be
no dilemma, and no nonprofit sector.
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Financial Problems
The Peterson Commission reported that private giving has fallen a
little behind the trend of the GNP in recent years while the needs of
charitable organizations have increased at a rate significantly faster
than the GNP. Increased costs and decreased income for nonprofit
institutions, assuming good management, result primarily from four causes.
First, salaries and personnel expenses have increased as professional
standards have been raised and competition with industry for personnel
has intensified. Second, the demand for nonprofit services has risen
sharply, but there has not been a concommitant rise in service fees.
Third, many institutions produce a social "good" or service that benefits
more people than they can charge directly. a fourth explanation is
that in many instances, economies of scale do not necessarily apply to
nonprofit organizations as they do to manufacturing. The "unit costs"
of charitable services (one hospital patient-day, yearly educational
cost of one student, etc.) markedly exceeded the rise in the consumer
price index and even the rise in salaries for the personnel of charitable
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organizations between 1962 and 1968. But the big cost, again, is people,
and salaries and expenses are particularly susceptible to inflation.
From 1966 through 1968, for example, with v/ages and salaries rising at
twice the level of the. consumer price index, the Ford Foundation could
maintain its $200 million program budget ceiling "only at the price of a
real redirection in charitable purchasing power of some six to eight
69
percent a year," and holding annual overall increases to five percent.
This would be a creditable performance, even for a commercial enterprise.
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The simple fact seems to be, however, that more money is going out of
the nonprofit sector than is coming in.
Businessmen and public officials are sometimes impatient with this
situation. They feel that any organization, if properly administered,
should be able to be economically viable. The analogy of the commercial
to the nonprofit sector, however, is not valid. First, the nonprofit
institution is not an independent economic unit.
The business firm, alone among non-governmental institu-
tions, generates its own wealth. Whereas a labor union
. . . a charitable institution . . . receives the money
it uses out of its members' pockets and consumes its assets
in the course of performing the functions for which it was
organized. . . . The better a corporation performs, the
more money it obtains; the better a voluntary association
serves its members, the more money it is likely to spend
and to require from its members. u
Second, the products of the nonprofit sector are, by definition, not sold
at a profit and are, in fact, sold at a loss. Colleges and universities
are a good example. At a small high tuition liberal arts college, such
as Amherst College, a student pays about $4,000 tuition which is less
than 40 percent of the actual "unit cost" of his "education." At the
University of Massachusetts, with a vastly greater enrollment, the dif-
ferential is even more significant. A student at a state university may
pay as little as 15 percent of his educational costs. The rest is paid
by the public, the people of the state. At the private institution, the
60 percent remainder is provided by private gifts and interest on endowment
which itself was initiated and is preserved by "private" donations. General
Motors could not sell cars at 40 percent of cost for very long.
The nonprofitability of third sector institutions places a tremendous
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burden on their investment management. The Annual Report of the Russell
Sage Foundation sketches the difficulties involved:
The Foundation's primary investment objective is to
provide for its short- and long-term financial needs
so the Foundation can carry out its tax-exempt purpose
of improving social and living conditions in the United
States. . . . The Foundation, for example needs a regu-
lar flow of interest and dividends (augmented sometimes
by portions of specified principal funds) to fulfill its
operating purpose. Income must also be sufficient to
absorb excise tax payments stemming from the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 and to enable the Foundation's activities
to expand in the future.
Very few commercial enterprises must meet these kinds of demands without
selling a good or service for profit.
A third financial bind that increasing numbers of nonprofit institu-
tions face, which is usually not a problem with commercial enterprises
,
is the character of investment included in the institution's portfolio.
Especially if an organization is concerned with "improving social and
living conditions," it must be careful not to invest in corporations
which are undoing its work by polluting the atmosphere, creating inhumane
weapons of war, or not observing fair employment practices. As recent
experience with "social action" mutual funds has shown, this is a very
hard order to fill. Most "big money" is to some extent "dirty money."
The trend now seems to be an "all-other-things-being-equal" philosophy
which is to say that if a company is profitable and is a "responsible"
citizen, it is to be chosen over a company which is equally profitable, but
is not responsible. Russell Sage elevates the language.
The investment philosophy favors, if the primary investment
criteria (i.e., profitability) are satisfied, investment in
shares of companies that are clearly committing capital ^
and management to alleviating wide-spread social problems.
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Dependence upon the good will of others, a high susceptibility to inflation
and severe investment restrictions are thus the rather unique and serious
financial problems faced by nonprofit organizations.
The reality of this situation is brought sharply into focus with
just a few examples. "The total operating revenue of all our nation's
hospitals, public and private, from patient care—including insurance pay-
ments, medicare, and similar payments," pointed out Senator Bayh before
the Senate Banking Committee during the Lockheed hearings, "fell $662
million short of total expenses in 1969." ^ Bayh went on to stress that
this not only means serious limitations in the provision of health care
for the country, but also a threat to the livelihood of the nation's 2.4
million hospital workers. Bridging the gap between medical care and educa-
tion, Bayh reported that "in state after state, legislators are being
asked to bail out sinking medical schools with emergency grants totaling
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many millions of dollars." This is in spite of the fact that there is
an estimated shortage of 50,000 physicians in the United States. Non-medical
education is not any better off. The Carnegie Commission report of 1970
indicated that at that time 540 colleges and universities, enrolling more
than 1.6 million students or 21 percent of all college students in America,
75
were m serious financial difficulties.
What is particularly dismaying about these facts is that private
giving is actually increasing, and at unprecedented rates. The Council
for Financial Aid to Education in its 1970-71 publication, Voluntary
Support of Education
,
reported a significant rise.
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The total voluntary support of colleges and universities
in 1970-71 is estimated at $1,860 billion. This is a
new record high, 3.3 percent above the previous high
of $1,800 billion set in 1968-69 and 4.5 percent above
last year's estimated total of $1,780 billion. All of the
increase in total support was due to increased giving by
alumni (up to 20 percent) and non-alumni individuals^ and
much of this resulted from a sharp gain in becruests
.
Even with more people giving away more money, nonprofit organizations con
tinue to slip further into debt. The pool of "private" resources does
not seem to be able to meet the pressing demands of the third sector.
Help for the Nonprofit Sector
Politics and money, then, are the two major problems which plague the
nonprofit sector, hindering its initiative in exploiting otherwise unique
institutional freedoms. The two problems are exacerbated by the fact that
they are inextricably intertwined. This is most apparent in addressing
suggested solutions to the funding of nonprofit organizations.
The Peterson Commission highlighted the dilemma early in its delibera-
tions :
Legislative and executive leaders must decide whether
they wish to encourage more private giving as a strategy
for the solution of our social problems or to rely more
heavily on public funding.
The statement recognizes two important realities. First, any solution is
ultimately grounded in, the political process; it is public authority
which controls and directs the nonprofit sector. Second, granting this
fact, financial rescue can ostensibly come from only two sources, both of
which are regulated by public policy. The first option is to increase
private giving and the second is for the public sector to assume res-
ponsibility for nonprofit functions directly.
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To increase private giving means to structure the tax laws in such
a way that more money will flow from the profit to the nonprofit sector.
As indicated earlier, private giving without significant tax incentives
would amount to very little. There are three basic objectives to be
fulfilled in an effective tax incentive program. The first is to direct
private resources into truly charitable channels. This suggests that
a) genuine charitable organizations are recognizable to public authority
and b) there is some public consensus on what a charitable organization
is. Public policy could presumably direct "tax" dollars in any direction,
but to allow them to escape outright from the public treasury can be
justified only by insuring their employment elsewhere for the public
welfare. Second, the tax policy must be efficient in eliciting funds
for nonprofit organizations. There must be real incentives, devised in
such a way that the most money possible is freed for the third sector.
Finally, in the words of the Peterson Commission, "the distribution of
the inducements among taxpayers (must) not offend any strong community
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sense of fairness." Everyone must get the same benefit from taking
advantage of tax exemptions.
All three of these objectives, however, cannot be met if philanthropy
is to be benefitted most. The most effective tax policy, as far as reci-
pient organizations are concerned, is the one which generates the most
money. This is usually done by bestowing tax advantage based on actual
dollar amount , rather than percentage of income. While the latter is more
equitable, the former is more effective. Fund raisers use what they call
the "80-20 rule," which simply means that eighty percent of the income
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of a nonprofit institution usually comes from about twenty percent of its
patrons. This further implies that it is the "big givers" at whom the
most appealing tax incentives should be aimed.
The second major objection to reliance upon a tax incentive system
for the sole support of philanthropy is that it leads to manipulation by
those who benefit from it. With shrewd planning a wealthy philanthropist
can actually make money by giving it away. There is something repugnant
to the morally sensitive about a person living in relative luxury from the
interest on municipal bonds or from a general life-income plan. It just
is not fair, the contention runs, that someone who does no work can profit
so much and be so highly regarded for his "philanthropy," especially if
his or her wealth is inherited or otherwise unearned. This kind of argu-
ment is anathema to those who manage the nonprofit sector, but it is a real
consideration for many who do not.
The third objection is that no matter how effective and how equitably
structured a tax incentive system is, it is extremely difficult to administ-
er. Evidence of this fact is in the miriad of procedures and regulations
now employed by the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service
for enforcing the confused system in existence. The fact is that reliance
upon tax exemptions has not maintained the health of the third sector.
Given the failure of the tax incentive system and the increasing need
of charitable organizations the Peterson Commission concluded that "before
long, public charities will be compelled to return to Congress for more
assistance." Higher education has already resorted to this measure by
asking for increased and direct support of student aid programs. During
the last two sessions of Congress, Representative Edith Green of Oregon
has sponsored legislation providing for per capita destribution of public
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funds to all qualifying institutions of "higher learning." Senator Pell
of Rhode Island in the last session sponsored a bill calling for federal
money to be disbursed on an institutional basis with wide discretionary
powers for its use by the recipient institution. Higher education itself
defeated these measures by splitting in its support for them. Public
institutions favored the Green bill and private institutions supported
Senator Pell. With the defeat of both bills and increased federal belt-
tightening, higher education is more on its own than ever.
Senator Bayh recognized this trend in his testimony before the Senate
Banking Committee in its hearings on the Lockheed loan guarantee. Bayh's
point was that many nonprofit institutions needed help as much or more
than did Lockheed, and perhaps with better justification. Short of out-
right grants, Bayh proposed loan guarantees similar to that being consider-
ed for the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Specifically, he called for
(1) defining precisely which social institutions would be eligible for
emergency assistance; (2) applying the same criteria used in a business
guarantee, ensuring that requests by petitioners would be last resort
measures; (3) expanding the proposed Emergency Loan Guarantee Board to
include at least one public official to protect the interests of the non-
profit sector; and (4) requiring "that at least 50 percent of the total
amount of loan guarantees actually extended in any fiscal year, be committed
for these health and educational needs." Bayh's suggestions were not
taken seriously, although they showed recognition of a problem which bears
on the "public interest" and which is as legitimate a concern for congres-
sional consideration as was the rescue of a commercial enterprise.
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Nevertheless, assuming that the public's interest in the nonprofit
sector was suddenly aroused, there may be some virtue in moving slowly
to federal support. Attorney Thomas A. Troyer maintains that "if private
choice and private control are to remain important in this sector of
our national life, public charities will need help of other kinds ." 80 His
own suggestions, while not relying on direct governmental subsidies, do,
however, call for a restructuring of tax policy or the establishment of a
government matching gift program, both ideas clearly looking to public
authority for their substance. Another possibility for nongovernmental
assistance is suggested by the Research Corporation in its Annual Report.
With the Administration's preference to allot to the
private sector those tasks it can do best, it would
seem that use of these existing organizations (private
research and granting foundations, for example) in
drawing together other private interests could provide
an organized effort which could efficiently effect the
transfer of technology consistent with the desires of
governmental authorities, the needs of the people and
the realities of the established industrial economy.®"*"
While even a consortium of the twenty-four largest banks in the country
could not save Lockheed, it is conceivable that combinations of nonprofit
organizations would be able to strengthen their collective financial
positions and go at least part way to a solution of the problem of depend-
ence on other sectors. The absence of "anti-trust" legislation for nonprofit
organizations would seem to encourage this kind of activity. The one signi-
ficant drawback might be that a consortium, to paraphrase an old saying,
would only be as rich as its poorest member. So far, the more successful
foundations and public charities have not wanted to carry their less
affluent sister institutions.
Options for improving the financial position of nonprofit organizations
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seem to be four. First is the status quo, which would perhaps leave the
stronger institutions and "weed out" less successful ones, thereby reducing
competition for the tax-exempt dollar. While a realistic approach, this
alternative recognizes neither the complexity nor the importance of the
third sector, nor does it address the basic problems as sketched above.
Second, existing tax policy could be revised to stimulate private giving
to philanthropy. This has the advantage of a show of confidence by public
authority for the third sector
,
but probably would perpetuate or increase
inequities in tax benefits which would be fiercely contested by various
groups and public officials, and perhaps by the public at large. Third,
the public sector may begin to develop such a concern for areas of endeavor
previously reserved to the private charities that it begins to push them
from the field and deal with the problems directly. This is highly unlikely
for churches for instance, and would not be true of the more obscure non-
profit organizations. Nevertheless, with a dramatic influx of federal
money and attention directed to problems now dealt with by private chariti.es,
the position of the nonprofit sector as a whole would be seriously threatened.
Finally, the least explored and perhaps therefore least likely solution
to the problems of third sector finance is the consortium approach. Until
this idea has the benefit of more empirical evidence behind it, its viabi-
lity is questionable.
The second major problem for nonprofit organizations is political.
The discussion of finance confirms the notion that the very existence of
the third sector is dependent upon public authority. This is, in itself,
an obvious problem. No solution to the dilemma can avoid the fact that
the public sector must play at least some role in structuring support for
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the nonprofit sector, with this in mind, suggestions for improvlng ^
position of nonprofit organizations regarding their dependence upon
government must be limited.
A first proposal would be to eliminate any pretense of "privacy" in
the third sector and to make government directly responsible for the pro-
jects now undertaken by nonprofit organizations. The scale of modern life
would veto this in its extreme form-even government is not big enough to
do all the tasks performed by the nonprofit sector. Short of "nationali-
zation," then, would be direct and substantial subsidy. Objections to
this are strong, not only from the commercial and public sectors, but also
from nonprofit organizations themselves. Those in government and commerce
argue that such disbursal of public funds would be inappropriate and
would lack control by public authority, which is to say that they do not
now have enough federal help for themselves, and to cut the pie three ways
would be to dilute their own resources. The nonprofit people claim that
government subsidy would bring a "loss of independence" through government
control, would subject nominally private organizations to "partisan poli-
tics," and would therefore further reduce the initiative and creativity,
which supposedly is the halmark of the nonprofit sector. Because subsidy
is favored by no one, then, it hardly makes a realistic suggested solution.
A third proposal, an alternative to more direct public control through
government subsidy, is to grant the third sector even more independence.
Joseph Goulden
,
after elaborating the crippling effects of political re-
strictions, maintains that accountability could be maintained, even in
these more "private" organizations by encouraging or forcing the nonprofit
organizations to be more candid about their operations.
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Give foundations, (for instance) freedom to perform
as they please, short of direct intervention in a
political campaign, provided that the public has a
participating role in their conduct and that there
is full disclosure of what is happening and when
it is happening. 82
Such public participation, he suggests, could be accomplished by putting
individuals from the public sector on the boards of directors of nonprofit
organizations, conducting open board meetings, and increasing the pub-
lications programs of nonprofit institutions. There is some evidence,
in fact, that elements of the third sector are moving in this direction.
At this point it certainly is not nonprofit policy to include active
public sector people among institutional trustees or to hold open board
meetings. However, more detailed annual reports are appearing, election
or appointment procedures for boards of directors are being much more
widely publicized, and at least one foundation is now issuing a monthly
"news letter" describing its policies and activities which is sent to
libraries and other appropriate public places.
A fourth suggestion is to recognize the potentially political charac-
ter of nonprofit organizations and to allow them at least the same access
to the political process allowed to the commercial sector. Since 1962,
profit-making enterprises have been granted tax deductions for their
lobbying activities as legitimate business expenses. Not only are
nonprofit organizations not granted financial consideration for lobbying,
but the 1969 Tax Reform Act made it clear that they were not to parti-
cipate in any activity which might "influence legislation." Nor are
they allowed even to share with public officials results of their projects
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on a consulting basis. The lack of political influence was acutely felt,
especially by the foundations, in their attempts to modify the Tax
Reform Act. They had no constituency, no pressure to bring to bear
against legislators whose votes might be influenced by grassroots voices.
The employees and subcontractors of Lockheed certainly were heard by
Congress, but the recipients of nonprofit largess were not to be found.
The cynical response is because they are few. A more realistic reason
is because they are many, varied, and unorganized. Senator Muskie has
recognized this, and in the spring of 1971, introduced a bill which
would remove the substantial limitation for direct communications by
83public charities with legislative bodies and personnel. His bill
failed.
Fifth, and least comprehensive but perhaps more realistic, is simply
to ask for more public concern about the third sector. Fritz Heimann
speaks of the Peterson Commission's discovery about public authority's
lack of interest.
Our conclusion was that nobody at a policy level was
paying much attention to the interests of the philan-
thropic sector. The decisions which went into the
foundation provisions of the '69 Act were largely
made by people on the staffs of the two Congressional
Committees, and by people on the lower staff level at
Treasury. The underlying policy issues weren't even
being considered by anybody at a higher level in the
Administration. 84
Certainly a segment of the American system which, in 1968, accounted
for $15.8 billion, and which, between 1955 and 1968 outstripped the GNP
by 37% deserves more than passing attention.
All five very sketchy proposals for the improvement of the nonprofit
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sector's political position involve a clear acknowledgement of its poli-
tical character. After this, other suggestions are variations. Perhaps
the most outstanding fact is that none of these tentative solutions
completely resolves the political question, nor do they even begin to
address the equally significant financial problems. Money and politics
remain as rather high, unpadded, tightly linked hurdles for the nonprofit
sector.
Summary
A summary of this review shows a collage of facts, figures, assertions
and contradictions that leave an unclear picture of the nonprofit sector.
The definitions given by the Internal Revenue Service as to those organi-
zations eligible for tax-exempt status allow room for great variety in
the sector, yet tell little about its specific characteristics. The
fact seems to be, that although the third sector has achieved significant
proportions in terms of economic impact on the American system, it has
not received concommitant attention by the public or the government. Ihe
first serious interest taken by Congress in recent years was the 1969
Tax Reform Act, which was designed more to guard against a reoccurance
of recent abuses, than to capitalize on the real or potential value of
nonprofit organizations. Certain provisions of the Act, such as the
required payout rate, may help to stimulate activity among nonprofit in-
stitutions; others, such as the political restrictions, may tend to inhibit
innovation in areas which now require unhampered creativity to be resolved.
The key point of the entire discussion is that there has been a
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failure on the part of public authority and by the nonprofit sector
itself to address the fundamental issue involved, and that seems to be
the basically public nature of these
-private" nonprofit organizations.
The third sector derives its existence by money freed to it via tax
policies, yet it is not accountable to the public. Nonprofit organiza-
tions genuflect before the altar of "private" exploration of social and
scientific problems, but understandably stop short of activity which might
displease elements of the public sector and would therefore threaten their
tax-exempt status. In other words, nonprofit organizations are regarded
as private under some circumstances and public under others.
Crippling as this dilemma is, it may seem rather academic in view
of the crucial financial situation facing most nonprofit organizations.
Resources simply are not meeting the increasing demands for services.
Efforts to rescue the nonprofit organizations either are not taken
seriously or become hopelessly entangled in political questions. Indivi-
duals increase their own gifts, yet the sector continues to suffer a
chronic lack of funds. More money goes out than comes in.
Even in the short run, then, satisfactory answers to financial prob-
lems can be found only through a resolution of the more basic problems
which are political. What is essential is a clear definition of the role
of nonprofit institutions in American society and how they are to be
funded. If they are to address public concerns, let the public support
them more effectively and share in their management. If they are to
preserve a private status, then government funding and its subsequent
influence must be withdrawn and the institutions left to shift for
themselves
.
Perhaps proposing these distinctions is too neat, too unreal; an
impossibility in a society complicated by rapid changes of scale and
technology. Perhaps public policy makers can no longer afford to cast
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these questions in the traditional terms of "public" and "private." The
nonprofit institutions may have outgrown their role as charities, as
societal stop-gaps and may have become agencies whose value as independ-
ent, creative problem-solvers is vital to the public interest. These are
the questions public policy makers have so far avoided. As demands upon
public authority to meet growing public needs increase, however, they
are questions which will have to be answered.
CONCLUSION
Emerging from an admittedly sketchy study of the relationship between
the public and private sectors in contemporary America is a rather confused
picture. Some of the most basic terms, such as "public interest" and
enterprise are far from precise and indeed seem to have varied
meanings shaded by circumstance and perspective. Nevertheless, there
are some unmistakable facts
,
issues and conclusions which are apparent
and deserve final consideration.
The most noticeable fact evolving from the discussion is that things
have changed. Chapter I emphasized this as more than a trite observation
with a quick review of how World War II, the Cold War and rapidly growing
technology have contributed to a dramatic change of scale and increasing
complexities in both public and private sectors. Central to this change
has been the development of the commercial sector to a position of at
least suggested dominance in the total American system. The Lockheed case
is a concrete example of this phenomenon. While maintaining its role as
a private enterprise, Lockheed successfully argued that its demise would
have national consequences, that its preservation was in the public interest,
and that therefore its survival should be an object of public policy. No
better example of the impact of technology, change of scale, and the
attendant confusion about public and private roles could be used to demon-
strate a change in the American system. The third chapter was a glance at
the sector which makes obsolete the equation of public with government and
private with commerce. Nonprofit institutions account for a vastly greater
part of the American economy than they did just a few years ago and have
their own unique relationships with public authority and private enterprise.
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These special relationships not only highlight legal and logical incon-
sistencies in the political and financial character of the nonprofit
institutions, but also point to dichotomies between practice and principle
in the other sectors.
A corollary fact, then, is that while the American political-economic
system has experienced some rather significant changes, institutions have
remained static in form and function. Certainly there is innovation in
some quarters; but the basis of all significant "private" organization is
still corporatism—even in the nonprofit sector. The Dartmouth legacy
lives to protect the privacy of nongovernmental institutions. In that
doctrine, and wrapped in all of the traditional understandings of free
enterprise and American entrepeneurship, lies the maintenance of the con-
ceptual distinction between public and private and the subsequent preserva
tion of corporate organization. Therefore, Lockheed could claim with
some force that public authority had a responsibility for protecting the
corporation's private interests which, because of scale, also affected
the public interest. The fact that public money was used to support a
private enterprise did not jeopardize that company's private status. Like
wise, nonprofit institutions claim the rights of privacy in order to
enhance their innovative quality, localized control, and political neutral
ity; while at the same time they are utterly dependent upon public policy
9
for their survival.
Emergent Issues
From these two obvious facts, the change in general conditions encom-
passing all sectors of the American system plus the relative stability of
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institutional organization, emerge three key issues: (1) the character
of the distinction between public and private; (2) the definition of the
public interest; and (3) the resultant nature of public policy. With
regard to the first, there seems to be no clear locus for a distinction
between public and private; it is apparently a matter of convenience.
Lockheed is a private corporation ala Dartmouth
,
but because it was "affected
with a public interest"
(
Munn ) it apparently deserved public help. Nonprofit
institutions use public resources for private projects which, it is
claimed, will ultimately benefit the public. There is more at stake here
than semantics. Both kinds of institutions seek the benefits of private
organizations and public support, but apparently refuse to accept the
responsibility for either. They will not accept failure as a true mark
of competition in a free enterprise private system, nor will they accept
public control and monitoring as a condition of public support.
In short, private institutions, commercial and nonprofit, want their
cake and try to eat it too. They are able to walk this tightrope because
of legal and political precedents set at other times in other circumstances.
Certainly the past must be employed as a helpful guide, but when it has
brought the traveler to unexplored territory, the pioneering must begin
anew. The logical extensions of the Dartmouth doctrine, contemporary
qualifications and loopholes aside, are ridiculous when placed in the
r
modern context. For example, there seems to be nothing to prohibit a
corporation, endowed with the rights of a legal person, from seeking the
benefits of government welfare instead of declaring bankruptcy. The argu-
ments against such a possibility may be subtle and complex, but the basic
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principle poses no difficulty for this proposition. It may be argued, in
fac
,
that this is exactly what Lockheed did. Similarly
,
while nonprofit
organizations qualify as private institutions, they are denied the poli-
tical rights that corporations have in lobbying and individuals have in
direct political participation. The reason is that they use tax money
which, in effect, is public money. The question comes down to whether
nonprofit institutions are public or private.
The point is that despite a rather complete examination of the Lockheed
case and a brief but conscientious study of the nonprofit sector, the dis-
tinction between public and private is still at issue. Institutions are
private when seeking protection against the government and public when
seeking money from it. Furthermore, profit and nonprofit perspectives are
not necessarily consistent or congruent. It is improper, therefore, to
speak of a public-private dichotomy when the private side alone has so
many shades of meaning. While the distinction may have been useful in
building the American system, it appears to have very little currency today.
The second unresolved issue is the definition of the public interest.
An expanded arena for public discourse makes it impossible or rare for
the public interest to be identified with only one segment of the public.
There are too many competing voices to allow industry or railroads or
even defense to claim a corner on the public interest. At the same time,
the fact that there are fewer and fewer distinctions between public and
private activities suggests that almost any commercial or nonprofit
activity of significant scale is affected with the public interest. If
criterion could be selected out of the jumble of values involvedany one
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in the name of the public good, however, it would probably be the immediate
economic wellbeing of the largest number of people. The issue that clinch-
ed the Lockheed case was unemployment and the economic hardships that a
Lockheed failure would cause. The catalyst for Congressional action in
the third sector was reported abuse of tax dollars by nonprofit institu-
tions. In ether words, perhaps the most accurate, but certainly far from
rigorous interpretation of the public interest is concern for the public's
money.
The third issue not clarified by this study involves the standards,
criteria, or basic rationale for contemporary public policy. One thing
that can be said is that nowhere in quoted discussions or written material
used here has there been a well-articulated, unequivocal explanation of
public policy. If the tentative equation of public interest with economic
immediacy has any validity, it would not be unreasonable to surmise that
public policy would be directed to the preservation of economic stability.
That this may in fact be the case is supported by three apparent attributes
of the public policy considered in this essay. The first is responsiveness.
Both the Lockheed loan guarantee and the 1969 Tax Reform Act were responses
by Congress to situations developed beyond the immediate concerns of pub-
lic authority. Secondly, their responsiveness has a markedly ad_ hoc
quality. The Lockheed case produced a successful bill only for a limited
loan guarantee for Lockheed—it did not establish standards or mechanics
for similar situations. Likewise, the education lobby has been somewhat
effective in securing public assistance, but that is only one part of the
greater nonprofit picture which encompasses a variety of institutions
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serving the public, directly and indirectly, yet not finding adequate
resources. Responsiveness and ad hoc application of public attention to
what turn out to be public problems lead to the third attribute of public
policy which is the lack of a comprehensive insight into public needs.
Because of the onslaught of demands made upon public authority, what
results is a measure here, an act there, but little attempt to organize
public decision-making into a rational, consistent, well-articulated
public policy.
Despite the uncomfortable vagueness of the emergent facts and issues,
some general conclusions are possible. First, there is a sense in which
the American system, a term made appropriate by the complexity and inter-
relatedness of contemporary society, works in a way not far removed from
the pluralist perspective. Lockheed won its case in Congress because it
received the votes, and the votes were undoubtedly stimulated by some
kind of constituent pressure. Foundations lost their case against the
1969 Tax Reform Act because they could not generate enough constituent
support. The actual merits in each case, while debated extensively,
seemed in the final analysis to be obscured by rather simple political
considerations. Competing interests applied to public authority and the
most vocal won. Furthermore, the resultant policies appeared to be
decided on negative imperatives. For instance, the threat of unemployment
was enough for Lockheed's victory—not an evaluation of the product itself
or of the implications either of the product or of the precedent in grant-
ing the guarantee to Lockheed. The defeat by Congress of the proposal to
build a supersonic transport may be a counter example; yet even then,
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Congress was vetoing instead of initiating. Another example is the fact
that the 1969 Tax Reform Act was intended more to prohibit abuses than to
exploit or expand the potential of the nonprofit sector, it may not be
inaccurate, then, to agree with a conception of the American system as
one in which organized interests barter for the ad hoc attention of public
authority.
If this is the case, the second general conclusion must be that while
the American system does function to a certain extent, it falters because
it is not recognizing modern realities or necessities. The Dartmouth
doctrine is obsolete; corporate welfare is as unacceptable a proposition
as is the financial and political position of nonprofit institutions. By
perpetuating the arcane and archaic distinctions between public and private,
the public interest must necessarily be construed in short-run terms or
at best in terms of the survival of various corporate entities. Public
policy thus becomes a series of mere ameliorative measures within a rela-
tively static institutional context. With the presence of vocal independent
interests competing for public attention, there is an absence of well
articulated, over-all societal goals toward which the complex energies of
the various components of the system can be directed. Finally, out of
this comes no clear and agreed upon understanding of the role of public
authority as anything but a protector of discreet interests and an arbiter
of disputes.
New Directions
The facts, issues, and tentative conclusions expressed here lead to
a few passing observations about possible new directions for the relation-
ships between the public and private sectors, and perhaps to some new
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understandings of the traditional concepts of public interest and public
policy. A first step is a recognition of the contemporary context. There
is no going "back to normalcy" after the Depression, World War II, the
Cold War, Vietnam and the threat posed to the environment by the modem
way of life. Crisis, it seems, is the norm and not the exception. If
so, there must be an adaptation of our institutions to meet demands of
complexity and scale? a restructuring perhaps not unlike that undergone
in the second World War. Whatever the format, the key point is that
traditional understandings of public and private distinctions are no
longer appropriate some new accommodation with reality must be made.
The "patterns of social relations" must change to meet the facts of
life. Our problems are apparently growing too large for our institutions
to handle. The manner in which we organize our society is experiencing a
period of transition which is marked by redefinition of the relationship
between the federal government and the rest of society. There must be a
replacement of the Dartmouth doctrine with a consistency of concept and
policy toward elements of the commercial as well as the nonprofit sector.
There must be a candid and codified recognition of the public and there-
fore political nature of private institutions of significant scale. And
finally, there must be developed a comprehensive public policy based on
the long-term interests of the public at large as agreed upon by the
public's elected representatives.
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